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The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

**Newspapers Coverage of the Egyptian January 25 Revolution: A Framing
Analysis**

A Thesis Submitted to the

Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Master of Arts

by Ekram Ibrahim

Bachelor of Arts, Journalism and Mass Communication, 2006, AUC

Under the supervision of Dr. Rasha Abdulla

May 2012

Dedication

I dedicate this study to the souls of those who lost their lives in the middle of Egypt's January 25 Revolution. I also dedicate this study to all living souls to help knowing how the media shape reality and how different this portrayal could be from real life.

Acknowledgments

"Life is a journey, not a destination," Ralph Waldo Emerson.

The process of thesis writing marks a rich learning experience in my life. The journey was worth every moment of hard work. I feel grateful for being given the opportunity to make a master's degree and to work on my master's thesis.

Am really grateful to the Lord for putting the strength and the faith in my heart to go through this journey. Am also most grateful for being showered with the most magnificent people whom without I would have never been able to make it.

I am thankful to my advisor and to my favorite professor, Dr. Rasha Abdulla. Thanks for her academic advices, deep thinking and intellectual mind that I have learned a good deal about mass communication and thesis writing. Dr. Rasha is the professor whom I voluntarily took extra electives to sit in her class and listen to her. Thanks for her confidence in me that I was able to get a good work done.

I am really thankful to have the greatest Dad in the world. He encouraged me all the way to pursue higher education and to achieve daring dreams. He is always on my side. He is always loving and caring.

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Abstract

The American University in Cairo

Thesis, Master of Arts, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

Title: Newspapers Coverage of the Egyptian January 25 Revolution:
 A Framing Analysis

Author: Ekram Ibrahim

Research Adviser: Dr. Rasha Abdulla

Month/Year: May 2012

This study analyzes the different frames used by popular newspapers Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm in covering Egypt's January 25 revolution. The researcher conducted a content analysis of news stories and news features of both newspapers during the 18 days of uprisings that started on January 25, 2011 and ended by former President Hosni Mubarak handing over power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11, 2011.

The study analyzes 241 stories in Al-Ahram and 174 stories in Al-Masry Al-Youm during this period. The researcher aimed at exploring the different frames used by each newspaper, whether those frames have varied along the period of study, and how media ownership affected those frames.

The results show that during the beginning of the revolution, Al-Ahram newspaper framed the events as "riots" and the protesters as "violent," while Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the events as a "protest" and the protesters as "the people." The coverage of both newspapers varied along the 18 days of uprisings. Al-Ahram took the revolutionaries' side during the last couple of days, while Al-Masry Al-Youm

started delegitimizing the protesters during the same period. The type of media ownership played a significant role in the framing of Egypt's January 25 revolution.

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Chapter one

Introduction

During any crisis, the mass media are among the main institutions that collect massive amount of information and disseminate it quickly. Moreover, media framing and agenda setting shape reality, thereby affecting the public opinion. Starting January 25, 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, then millions of Egyptians filled the streets of major cities of Egypt demanding “dignity, freedom and social justice.”

Massive protests, out of which “January 25 Revolution” was born, took place in the course of 18 days leading to the toppling of former President Hosni Mubarak, who had been president for 30 years, and many figures of his regime. During that time, the majority of Egyptians did not understand what was going on, people turned to different media sources searching for news that makes sense of what was happening. Television, online media (internet was shut down for five days during the revolution), radio and newspapers were the main source of information at that time. Media are very powerful in shaping events, especially in times of crisis, when people lose sense of what is happening around them, many turn to media for answers to their questions. In addition to stating what is happening, the public expects the media to interpret the situation, guide their behavior, and even mobilize relief efforts (Graber, 1987). This study will therefore look into two popular Egyptian newspapers: Al-Ahram, which is a state owned newspaper, and Al-Masry Al-Youm, a privately owned newspaper, to research if the type of media ownership has affected its framing

of the Egyptian January 25 Revolution. Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm were both popular in their respective ownership categories and are considered to a great extent representative of their ownership category, during the time of data collection. (ElMasry, 2011). This research uses quantitative research. It uses content analysis of news stories published in both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers during the 18 days of the Egyptian revolution (from January 25 to February 11) to find different frames used to portray the revolution, the relation between the media ownership kind and the frames used, and whether the frames have changed along the period of study or not.

Media under Mubarak

Setting the stage for January 25 Revolution, the political scene, media landscape as well as social movements have witnessed major changes during the last 10 years of former President Hosni Mubarak's era.

Few years before the Egyptian January 25 Revolution, the media have witnessed so many changes as a result of globalization, emergence of new media channels, changes in media ownership systems and changes in the political and social hemispheres.

Moreover, during Mubarak's era, media freedom flourished in comparison to the time of previous presidents of Egypt; Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar El-Sadat. Mubarak has stressed the idea of democracy and free press during his era. He has allowed all writers and newspapers that were banned during Sadat's era to start writing again (Amin, 2009). Moreover, some partisan press was also given more

ground; they were allowed to criticize the system but were so limited and had less power than the national papers as Al-Ahram and Al-Akhbar.

The Egyptian print media outlet is divided into three types:

- 1) State owned or semi state owned media.
- 2) Partisan media.
- 3) Private/independent media.

The state owned media is known to be the mouthpiece of the government and that its chief editors are assigned by the Shura Council. Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar and Al-Gomhouria are the main state owned newspapers. Al-Ahram is a media organization that produces several types of publications in different languages. It also has an enormous publishing house, where the majority of media publications are printed.

A major drawback taken against state owned media, besides being the mouth piece of the regime is that it only offers the “events only” reporting, they don’t provide context to the event; they don’t explain how or why the event happened (Grant, 2008). Al-Ahram is known for offering a broad spectrum of opinions on its commentary pages as prominent writers used to take Al-Ahram as their platform. That has changed by the emerging of the private newspapers, as some prominent writers have left Al-Ahram to work in newly established private newspapers. Example to that is prominent Islamist columnist Fahmy Howiedy, who has been writing a weekly column every Tuesday in Al-Ahram newspaper since 1985 till 2008. He then moved to El-Dostour private newspaper then to Al-Shorouk newspaper. Salama Ahmed Salama, is another prominent writer who moved from Al-Ahram to Al-Shorouk newspaper in 2008.

The partisan media, during Mubarak's era, and before private media has emerged, were the main voice of opposition. Partisan papers at that time included: Al-Wafd, serving the Al-Wafd liberal party; Al-Arabi of the Nasserist party; Al-Ahaly of the Karama Party; and Al-Ahrar of Al-Ahrar political party. In contrast to state owned media, one of the major challenges partisan press is facing is the lack financial support. As a result, some partisan newspapers were shut down and others functioned with tight resources. Al-Ahram state owned paper is supported by both the government and by being a hot spot for advertisement. Partisan newspapers while being an opposition, they used to practice self-censorship out of fear of being shut down (ElBendary, 2010). Partisan newspapers are not very popular in Egypt; party members along with their supporters read them (Grant, 2008).

For private owned media in Egypt, things were not stable. Al-Dostour newspaper for example was first published in 1995 with a license from Cyprus not Egypt. The Egyptian law enables publications printed in the free zone to license from abroad and get distributed in Egypt. Al-Dostour was one of the strong opposition papers at that time and it was being shut down by the regime more than once. The newspaper was shut down in 1998 and then opened again in 2005 to be published as a weekly publication, then it was published daily since 2007. Private newspapers published during Mubarak's era included; Al-Dostour, Al-Fajr, Al-Usbou, Al-Maydan and El-Shorouk. However, the first private newspaper to operate under a license from Egypt was Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, first published in June 2004. Al-Masry Al-Youm was first published in Arabic and currently it has both Arabic and English news portals. It has been working on being a multi-service multimedia news organization.

Media Freedom during Mubarak's Era

"The press during the era of Mubarak was also described as being deteriorated. This deterioration has hit both the national and the opposition ones."

(Amin, 2009, p.157)

The Egyptian government controls the licensing of newspapers. No newspaper is allowed to get published without a license. The former regime has benefited from this right to grant or deny publishing permits (Rugh, 2004). Moreover, the Freedom House reports that at least five news publications reportedly had their licenses revoked in 2009 (Freedom House, 2011).

According to Freedom House 2011 Freedom of the Press report, Egypt has declined from "partially free" to "not free" as a result of the violations to freedom of press that took place before November 2011 parliamentary elections, the latest elections that took place before the Egyptian revolution. These kinds of violations included closing satellite television channels, firing prominent Chief Editor; Ibrahim Eissa from el-Dostour independent newspaper, in addition to banning text message based news services. Not only that but also some journalists and bloggers have faced some harassments and arrests. "Regulatory bodies sought new ways to restrict freedom of expression and information." (Freedom House, 2011)

Reporters working for Al-Ahram newspaper report being responsible for making heavy propaganda for former president Mubarak (ElMasry, 2011 P.12). During protests for example there not allowed mentioning neither anti-president chants nor slogans. For state owned media, not only Mubarak was a non-touched issue, but also political leaders; particularly ministers were handled with much care. Partisan press as Al-Wafd for example experience assures that certain ministers who

were in good relation with the ruling party the NDP at that time were also held with care in their coverage. Al-Ahram's policy allowed for critical opinion pieces but not news that challenged the government or the status quo. The only exceptions to this general rule were events that were widely known amongst Egyptians and covered by virtually all news outlets. Only the competition at that time was the element forcing Al-Ahram to cover the events. (ElMasry, 2011 p.20)

The space of media freedom in Egypt has not only widened due to Mubarak's laws but also because of the changes in the media landscape that took place during that time. Hence, the rise of privately owned media has played a major role in freeing the press; changes did not only occur due to the embracement of new laws. Functioning by fear that free media would affect the sovereignty of the regime, Egypt has allowed private media under strict rules and the amount of freedom varied over the years (Krzysiek, 2009). The Internet and satellite opened up new global communication conduits, providing Egyptians with greater access to information while making government efforts to restrict information more difficult (Krzysiek, 2009).

During 2000, private television satellite channels have emerged in Egypt, which is considered the first expression of private media in Egypt. The first factor that revolutionized the Arab media scene started in the 1990s with the introduction to CNN to Egypt. CNN became phenomenal in the Arab world during the 1991 Gulf War. AlJazeera in 1996 was the second factor revolutionizing the Arab media. Another important development in Egypt's media is the launching of private channels Dream TV in 2001 and ElMehwar in 2002 and AlHayat, OTV and ONTV launched in 2008. "The satellite broadcasting revolution is definitely the most significant change the

Arab Middle East has undergone in the last twenty years," (Abdulla, 2010)

As Egypt let private channels only operate under strict rules, Al-Mehwar and Dream TV were allowed to operate from the Egyptian Media Production City (EMPC) in greater Cairo. This decision aligned with the fact that businessmen who own those channel were strongly related to the former President Mubarak, shows how the Egyptian regime was trying to balance between giving the room for private media to emerge, and making sure private media would not work against its interests (Sakr, 2007).

Print media witnessed similar initiatives. The emergence of Al-Masry Al-Youm has helped changing the discourse in newspapers in Egypt. In three years time, the independent newspaper was able to compete with the state owned newspaper, Al-Ahram (Grant, 2008). Al-Masry Al-Youm and other independent newspapers were known for providing a glimpse of unbiased journalism in comparison to partisan newspapers and state owned media.

Private owned media were giving a platform to political opposition voices in comparison to Al-Ahram and other state owned media. Topics like protests, workers movements, opposition parties' activities were mentioned in private media but not discussed with the same details in state owned media (Amin, 2009).

Beyond the constraints of information gathering and the 'red lines' detailed above, journalists at Al-Masry Al-Youm indicated that they felt mostly free in their reporting. One additional constraint, however, concerns the newspaper's ownership. Al-Masry Al-Youm is owned by a team of wealthy business tycoons and several reporters and editors indicated that there are limits to what the newspaper may write

about any of the owners or their business projects. A reporter once wrote an article discussing real estate price increases which referenced some of Sawiris properties, but the story did not make it past senior editors for publication. Sawiris is a business tycoon in Egypt who is recorded as one of the wealthiest people worldwide and he is one of the owners of Al-Masry Al-Youm. Another reporter, who covered the 2008 rockslides in Al-Muqattam, wrote that, according to engineers, many of the affected apartments – some of which were owned by Sawiris – were in poor condition. The story was edited heavily by editors and follow-up coverage included interviews with Sawiris and other apologists who said buildings in the region were in good condition (ElMasry, 2011).

Meanwhile, the newspapers readership in Egypt isn't high due to the high illiteracy rates. The total number of daily sold newspapers does not exceed a million copies in a country of over 90 million residents (CIA, 2012).

The Political Landscape

The political discourse during the latest years of Mubarak's era has showed people that the country is far beyond being described as democratic, thus has created popular social and political movements.

During the last few years of Mubarak's era, Egypt has become a "soft state." According to Galal Amin, a prominent columnist and writer, Egypt has become a government without law; it has stopped taking its core responsibilities, which has allowed corruption and individual feuds to take over the scene (Amin, 2009). The

delay of political reform in Egypt along with many suppressive actions was an open door for a mass uprising in the country (Meguid, 2005)

Moreover, the idea of getting Gamal Mubarak into power came about in 2002 when he was appointed chair of the “Committee of Policies” of the National Democratic Party, a new party committee at that time. Previously Mubarak the son was only a member of the dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP). From now on, the NDP has introduced political reform to Egypt; a reform that was not successful and later on lead to the Egyptian January 25 Revolution.

After 2004, the Egyptian constitution has witnessed some amendments, which were provocative to the people and thus lead to creating a stronger opposition and more angry citizens. In 2005, former President Mubarak has passed an amendment of the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections. However, the 2005 elections were not fair and Mubarak won it through many illegal voting. Also in 2005, Mubarak passed 34 amendments in the constitution and the way they were passed and written led to a draw back in the democratic movement in Egypt (Shourbagy, 2009).

Moreover, opposition parties were also trapped during Mubarak’s era. They were not allowed to communicate with the public. They suffered from diminishing membership and lack of operational funds. They were usually cited by many critiques as “caricature parties” (Amin, 2009, p. 53). A group like the Muslim Brotherhood was rarely cited in news stories published by state media and if they were mentioned, they were cited as a banned group. During 2005 parliamentary elections, members of the Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats in the parliament; 20 percent of the parliamentary

seats. It was the first time they win that number of seats. However in the 2010 parliamentary elections that were known for massive amounts of fraud, the MB members have won no seats. 2010 parliamentary elections were one of the major elements that led to January 25 Revolution, cause it was very clear that the election results were tailored by and for the good of members of the NDP (Chick, 2010).

Not only the above factors helped give rise to the revolution, but also police brutality was among the main reasons. The incident of beating “Khaled Said” in Alexandria to death has moved many citizens, especially that this incident was then widely covered in private and social media and the picture of Khaled Said spread everywhere creating emotional appeal (Ali, 2012).

The year 2004 was the beginning of real opposition working on the ground through protesting in the street. The Egyptian Movement for Change “Kefaya” has taken the streets for the first time without permission from the government (Shourbagy, 2009). Kefaya movement’s main slogan was the rejection of both the succession of Gamal Mubarak and of the fifth term for Mubarak as a president of Egypt. Ahmed Bahaa Din Shaaban, one of the founders of Kefaya movement, describes the immediate reason for founding Kefaya as being both “the socioeconomic deterioration and the increasing foreign threat represented by the invasion of Iraq” (Shaaban, 2008). The movement has rejected the 2005 presidential elections results, raising the word “enough” as their slogan. They used to protest around Egypt and they have called for El-Mahalla major strike in 2008 which is considered by many as one of the main roots of the Egyptian January 25 Revolution. Mahallah workers have gone on a strike on April 6, 2008 for almost three days,

protesting against low wages and inhuman working conditions. This strike reached further to protests around Mahallah governorate, something that lead governmental officials to pay Mahallah a visit and promise the workers to fulfill their demands; it was the first time where government officials respond to major protests (Ibrahim, 2012). Workers have continued protesting before the State Council in Egypt for more than a year before the revolution. This led many analysts to say that the workers' movement "has paved the road to January 25 Revolution." (Ali, 2012)

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

Agenda Setting

Historically, agenda setting has been defined as the association between social issues that citizens believe are important and the news media's editorial emphasis. In a compact literature review, Rogers and Dearing (1996) found agenda-setting has evolved into research on how public attention and public policy are influenced by the interaction of government, industry, interest groups, legislators, and the major professions including the press (Rogers & Dearing, 1996).

Maxwell McCombs and Donald L. Shaw first introduced agenda setting theory in their article published in 1972 in the *Public Opinion Quarterly*. The study was conducted to investigate the agenda setting capacity of the mass media in the 1968 American presidential campaign. The article studied the role the media play in focusing the public attention on certain issues, rather than its ability to affect people's attitudes. The researchers interviewed 100 undecided voters, and asked them questions assessing their concerns in general (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Rogers and Dearing (1994) explained that the term "agenda" includes both "issues" and "events." "Issues" include collective news coverage of a string of linked events that fit together in a large grouping, such as financial problems and wars. Meanwhile, "events" include happenings that are defined by time and space, as earthquakes and environmental crises.

Moreover, the agenda process includes three elements: media agenda, public agenda, and policy agenda (Rogers & Dearing, 1994). In determining their agenda,

media channels are influenced by “powerful groups,” this includes the funds that media production and distribution receive. Additionally, members of the ruling class in the society determine the media as well. Accordingly, media control is a commercially backed mass media system that portrays to their audiences the viewpoints of the ruling class (Roger & Dearing, 1994).

As for public agenda, researchers suggest that it relies on the mass media. Yet, Lazarsfeld and Stanton found that other factors influence the public agenda, as personal experience and interpersonal relationships (Rogers & Dearing, 1994).

However, studying policy agenda, Katz and Lazarsfeld suggested a “two-step-flow” model of communication that argued that opinions are initially dispersed by media, and then opinion leaders communicate them to the audience (Rogers & Dearing, 1994).

According to Severin and Tankard (2001), the media content is influenced by five elements. Those elements are; media workers’ influences, through their personal knowledge and expertise; media routines’ influences as media content is affected by communicators’ daily practices and circumstances; organizational influences which is related to the media organization’s objectives; outside influences as governments and lobbyists’ which control content; and the ideology influences which are related to society’s values and beliefs (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

In a process called “inter-media agenda setter,” McCombs (2004) explained the role of elite media in influencing other news media’s agendas (p.113). Giving the

U.S. newspapers as an example, McCombs explained that when *New York Herald Tribune* and *New York Times* were competing against each other in the mid-twentieth century, the editors of both newspapers were making final edits on their front pages in order to stay close to their competitors' coverage.

As for why agenda-setting takes place, McCombs (2004) referred to "the need for orientation" with new situations, similar to being in a new city, where a person needs a guide book to get oriented. The media satisfy people's needs for orientation with certain aspects. It was found that voters rely on media for orientation in deciding which candidates to elect. The need for orientation is influenced by two factors: relevance and uncertainty. Relevance refers to topics that are relevant to a person, such as employment. The more relevant the topic is, the higher the need for orientation would be. Second, when the uncertainty about a topic is high, the need for orientation would be also high.

Agenda setting has two levels. The first level describes the importance of "priming" and how issues highlighted by the media have a big impact on what the public are also concerned with. The second level agenda setting suggests that media coverage may move beyond what issues the people think about to influencing how they think about the issue (Craft & Wanta, 2004). The second-level of agenda setting describes the impact of salience of characteristics of media coverage on audiences' interpretation of these news articles. Framing is linked to the second level of agenda setting.

The Concept of Framing

“A media culture has emerged in which images, sounds, and spectacles help produce the fabric of everyday life, dominating leisure time, shaping political views and social behavior and providing the material out of which people forge their very identities” (Kellner, 1995).

The concept of framing is useful in finding out the vision the media portray for events, in addition to the interpretations and explanations they offer to the public (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009). Framing proposes that the media usually select certain issues or ideas or beliefs and highlight them to the public. “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993). A standard definition of framing: selecting and highlighting some facts of events or issues and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and or solution (Entman, 1993).

Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) explained framing, noting that “to frame is to select some aspects of a received reality and make them more salient in a communication text in order to suggest a particular problem definition, casual explanation, ethical evaluation, or recommendation for the item described” (p. 24).

Salience is elevated when frames highlight some information or news items over others in communication. Fiske and Taylor (1991) suggest that an increase in salience raises the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning, process it, and store it in memory (Entman, 1993). Humans seek explanations to the events. Portraying the news in one frame over the other usually

has an impact on the receiver (Jeffres, 1997).

The concept of framing signifies that communication is a dynamic process that consists of different phases: frame-building, and frame-setting and individual and societal consequences of framing (D'Angelo, 2002; De Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 2000). Frame building includes the aspects that establish the structural qualities of news frames; how journalists frame issues. The frame building process is developed through an ongoing communication between journalists, elites and social movements (De Vreese, 2005). Meanwhile, frame setting refers to the interaction of media frames with audiences' previous information, understanding of issues and predisposition (De Vreese, 2005).

Framing has been linked to second level agenda-setting, which suggests that media coverage may move beyond what issues we think about to influencing how we think about the issue (Craft & Wanta, 2004). The second-level of agenda setting describes the impact of salience of characteristics of media coverage on audiences' interpretation of these news articles (Scheufele, 2000).

Meanwhile, framing differ from agenda setting and priming in that it analyzes the factors that affect the way news is written. These factors include the cultural references, choice of sources, external agents influence and professional habits and values.

How the mass media frame causal relationships and explain events is one of the main questions raised by scholars researching framing theory. Jeffre (1997) explained this importance by giving the following example: in case we have a story of

a serial killer, the media has two choices, either to identify social problems of that killer such as a bad home, difficult environment, suggesting that some of the elements that lead to him being a killer lie in the environment and not only in his individual. Meanwhile, a television show may bring on all responsibility on the individual showing him rejecting all attempts by family and community to help. This is called “causality” frame; the news story gives a reason or a cause to the incident or event (Jeffres, 1997).

The placement and the size of the news piece are important elements in news framing (Brunken, 2006). Another factor in the salience of the news is the editors’ personal subjectivity on deciding what is news.

Framing effects

The significance of framing lies in that it can affect both individuals and society. An individual-level consequence may result in altered attitudes after exposure to certain frames. On the societal level, frames can affect processes such as political socialization and collective actions (De Vreese, 2005).

A framing effect occurs in two cases. First, when two "logically equivalent (but not *transparently* equivalent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options." The second is in case of describing an issue or event; a speaker’s emphasis on potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on those considerations while constructing their opinions (Druckman, 2001, p.45).

Media effects act on two different levels. They shape the way public affairs are presented, and they also mold the knowledge of each of the individuals who are exposed to its influence (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009).

Many studies were conducted on framing effects on both the audience and the society. Some found that audiences get affected by the elites framing of events and others think that audiences choose with full awareness, which frames to follow and comprehend. Drukman (2001) proposes that framing effects may occur, not only because elites seek to manipulate citizens, but rather because citizens wait to hear what elites have to say for guidance. Accordingly, those audiences choose which frames to follow in a systematic way. That takes framing from a way of manipulation to a way for guidance used by citizens for whom they consider to be credible elites.

Regarding the extent of the framing effects on audience, the majority of studies supported that framing has an effect on the audience, especially if the framing does not contradict with their previous thoughts and beliefs (Entman, 2010). Chong and Druckman (2007) and Entman (2010) assure that experiments and surveys show the actor who dominates the media does not have a magic effect on the public opinion because people tend to refuse whatever is incongruent with their prior thoughts (Entman, 2010).

There are times and elements when presenting the news framing become more effective on the public. One of those elements is the novelty of the phenomenon. As Beck (2003) states, on some occasions, reality goes beyond the established social

concepts, which are suddenly outdated and incapable of explaining a new turn of affairs. In this situation, the media acquire the power to give meanings, give explanations, attribute facts and make context out of some events. The media have this power because they have the space to name the new phenomena before others can as they need to communicate about these realities. Rojecky, (2005) gave the early days of globalization in the late 90s as an example of this, as people looked to the media for points of reference to enable them understand and make sense of the surroundings during the unexpected consequences of globalization (Rojecky, 2005).

A second condition that makes the media more effective is the outbreak of a crisis, or at least of situations that give people the impression that there is a crisis. It has been shown that in such circumstances, people's confidence in media discourse, and in the interpretations that take hold of public opinion, is greater than people's confidence in their own knowledge or opinions (De Vreese, 2005).

Accordingly, prior knowledge of the issue is an important factor in framing effects (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001). A number of scholars report stronger framing effects for receivers having less prior knowledge of the topic (Kinder & Lynn, 1990). Others demonstrate that more knowledgeable receivers are more susceptible because they possess more cognitive "hooks" to pick up the framed message (Rhee, 1997). Brewer (2003) demonstrated that citizens with more political knowledge are susceptible to framing, provided that the frames they receive are undisputed. In order to resolve the conflicting results concerning the impact of prior knowledge of political issues, Druckman and Nelson (2003) argued that it is not the knowledge as such that facilitates or hinders the impact of frames; rather, it is the

need to evaluate, regardless of the level of prior knowledge, which incites persons to assign more weight to considerations that fit into the frame (Druckman & Kjersten, 2003)

Finally, the media frame or interpretation is more readily accepted when it is transmitted through expressions, metaphors, values and ideas that have cultural resonance. “Cultural resonance” is an area of significance that is shared between politicians, the media and the audience, which stimulates ideas, principles and values belonging to the cultural context, communicating much more than the literal meaning of the text (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009). Cultural resonance does not interpret or frame a given issue in the same way as the frame itself does. It is a reference to the culture itself, or the system of principles, which makes the frame easier to understand and more likely to succeed. As Gamson (1988) states, resonances that evoke a cultural context make the frame more effective. The allusion to cultural values that define the identity of a society, and which are generally shared, helps the audience to understand and remember the interpretation of reality that is projected by the media. Cultural resonance can be understood as a reaction of empathy on the part of the audience when they recognize that the message contains an element from their cultural tradition (Schudson, 1989). It can also be viewed as an element of the text itself which evokes images or memories that form part of the audience’s cultural identity (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009).

According to a number of studies, the potential effect of frames largely depends on the degree of resonance between the frames applied in the news and particular schemas of the reader (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Hwang, Gotlieb, Nah, &

McLeod, 2007; Nabi, 2003; Shen, 2004). This proposition is formulated from a perspective that regards memory as a collection of cognitive nodes, with thoughts, feelings, and experiences associatively organized in schemas (Schmierbach, Zubric, Shah, & Kwak, 2004). Once primed by a framing device, a schema becomes more easily accessible and influences subsequent message processing (Hansen, 2007).

Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997) showed that framing effects work through a psychological process. In this process individuals think about the relative importance of different considerations offered to them by the media frame. They found also that media frames mainly work by altering belief of importance (Druckman, 2001). They present evidence suggesting that framing effects do not work by altering the accessibility of different considerations. They gave an example of the public opinion perceptions of the Ku Klux Klan rally, whether people will base their opinion on consideration-free speech or public safety. They showed that it happens to be accessible due to the frame, people consciously think about the relative importance of the considerations suggested by the frame. If the media portrayed the rally as a way of free expression and valued the right of freedom of speech then the audience would agree more with the event that is contrary to framing the event as a threat to the public safety.

Moreover, Lodge and Stroh (1993) found that the process of bringing thoughts and feelings to mind works “through the mechanism of spreading activation,” which plays a part in the cascade model. An example of that is a report showing a picture of Usama Bin Laden will likely activate the audience’s negative feelings and bring to mind conscious or unconscious memories of 9/11 and the destruction of the World

Trade Center. Another example when government spending for the poor is framed as enhancing the chance that poor people can get ahead, individuals tend to support increased spending. On the other hand, when it is framed as resulting in higher taxes, individuals tend to oppose increased spending (Entman R. , 2003)

Classes of Framing

According to Entman (2004) there are two classes of framing. First class is “substantive frames” which has at least two the basic functions of the framing theory in covering political events or issues or actors are present. The basic functions of the framing theory are “definition of the problem,” “giving causality to the problem,” “covering moral judgment” and “giving solutions to the problem.” The second class is the “procedural frames,” which give suggestions to ways of evaluating political actor’ legitimacy based on their technique, representatives and success (Entman, 2004).

The above criteria suggested by Entman can also be enriched by the tone used in the news story. In the tone, the reporter tends to give his/her personal opinion while telling the news. Tone is considered another part of media framing that influences the audience to think a certain way about a particular issue (Brunken, 2006).

Location of Frames

The frames are not only found in the text or the media in general, but according to Entman (1993), frames have at least four locations in the communication process. Those four locations are the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture.

First, communicators (may be the journalist, the anchor or the news producer) consciously or unconsciously make frame-guided judgments that organize their belief systems. In other words, the first location involves the content of frames and their joining together of “textual items (words and images) with the contextual treatment that they receive from framing devices” (D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2009). Journalists or reporters have to tell a story limited by both time and space, accordingly they tend to give meanings to events to maintain the audience interest, thus frame their story (Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vresse, 1999). Entman (2010) has described the decision-making the journalists make on the text they produce which is based on their beliefs as a kind of “bias.” Several critics suggest that reporters and editors use their personal ideologies and beliefs in making news decisions yet, journalists themselves deny such bias.

Mass media research recommends that framing of issues is highly affected by the journalists' values. One of the aspects of framing editorials, letters to the editors and columns in newspapers are the values of journalists themselves (Hoffman & Slater, 2007). Hoffman and Slater have conducted research on the framing of health issues in opinion articles. They wanted to test how the values of the journalists affect their writing and came out with the above conclusion, that there is a direct correlation between both even in issues that highly ideological. Other research shows that a reporter's stereotype and predispositions influence the tone in which he/she presents the information. Also the editors' selection and assignment of news stories that to great extent are affected by their values, affect the framing of the news (De Vreese, 2005).

Framing and Politics

News framing is important to study within that context, as audiences may have no direct experience with the event and therefore, depend on media accounts to stay informed and make rational decisions (Entman, 1991).

Framing was so much used and researched in politics because framing effects can extend from shaping the perception or opinion of receivers to making them favor a decision over the other. Framing effect occurs when two "logically equivalent" statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options" (Druckman, 2001). Framing has important implications for political communication (Entman, 1993). Politicians seeking support are compelled to compete with other others over news frames (Entman, 2004). The media's political influence arises from their ability to frame the news in ways that favor one side over another. (Entman, 2004) In general, media bias can help distribute political power. That explains how politicians with the help of the media play a significant role in shaping the political sphere of the public.

Evidence from experiments, surveys, and political campaigns suggests that public opinion often depends on which frames elites choose to use (Druckman, 2001). An example to that is the framing of the war of Iraq in US media. The debate before the war over the US policy towards Iraq was tackling only two options (war now or sanctions). There was no third option offered to the public as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. This framing was designed by the political elites. Thus other pieces of information were considered as "not newsworthy" and thus not covered by journalists (Entman and Page, 1994).

Ideally in free press, journalists should be able to report official views and politicians' views with an impartial perspective that allows their audience to create their own personal opinion. But in practice, the relationship between governing elites and news organizations is less distant and more cooperative than the ideal envisions (Entman, 2004).

Contrary to some scholarly interpretations, that doesn't render framing a minor feature of politics and policymaking. Framing effects on a small minority of citizens at the mass or elite level could have critical implications for political power. What matters to successful exertion of political power is whether a frame has a decisive impact on two key audiences, not people in general: first, citizens lacking strong ideological or partisan predispositions – in elections the swing or undecided voters – whose attitudes are most malleable; and second, political elites themselves (Entman, 2010).

Egyptian media frames function in the same fashion as that described by Entman, to choose, highlight, or exclude information, emphasize problematic aspects of one issue over another, formulate analysis, make moral evaluations, and suggest solutions (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). If Egypt is to evolve into a meaningful democratic society, then it is essential that attention is paid to the structure and representation of political issues. The exchange of information and ideas through a free press is a critical component of mass participation and a requirement for democratic responsiveness to public preferences (D'Angelo & Kuypers, 2009).

Chapter Three

Literature Review

Framing of Social Movements and Protests

The literature is not rich with many studies on framing of social movements and protests, yet the studies tackling the issue give a focused perspective on how the media frame protests. The media in case of protests take the side of the regime or the status quo, giving so much less weight to the protesters and to the ideologies they present (Brasted, 2005). The late 1960s constitute the beginning of the research of news framing of social, right, civil and peaceful movements (Tuchman, 1981).

Watkins (2001) studied the framing of the “Million Man March” which was highly attended and a well-publicized demonstration that took part in Washington DC in 1995. In this study, he analyzed the dominant framing practices in network television news channels, problem definition, use of sources, images and rhetorical devices used by journalists in covering the march at that time. His results show that the dominant framings used by journalists focused less on the issues that were close to the march but more on the racial and political points of view of one of the figures of the march, Louis Farrakhan. The results of the study show that the news networks framed Farrakhan as a “deviant” personality.

Moreover, Watkin (2001) proposed that one of the ways by which journalists and media people give vibe to the social movements’ stories is by making “celebrity spokespersons.” He explained that this was the reason why Farrakhan was so much

highlighted. Putting so much attention on one character has derived the public away from the dialogue about the main reason of the march; racial relations in the United States (Watkins, 2001).

Cooper (2002) did another significant research on the framing of social movements as he studied the media framing of the German peace protest that took place against Immediate-Range Nuclear Forces, the Gulf War and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) peace enforcement in Bosnia. Cooper's study was on German newspapers; *Die Tageszeitung* and *Der Spiegel*. Cooper studied the position the media takes during social movements, whether it would take the side of the peace protest or the side of the government. The elements used to test the media frames of social movements included the assessment of actors, the causes of a conflict, the effects of possible solutions and the appropriate response to the conflict. According to Cooper, the media played a significant role in portraying the movement, the coverage being positive or negative, that highly affected the public opinion and how they perceived the movement.

In most cases protests and demonstrations are not portrayed in a positive way but rather as a danger to the social order (Gans, 1979). During the coverage of most protests, reporters emphasize or magnify any violence done on the side of protesters as stone throwing and burnings (Gans, 1979). Accordingly, protests in most cases do not gain the public opinion support.

Protest Paradigm

One of the classifications of news frames is the "protest paradigm" which is

used in studying the framing of social movement or protests as they take place. The idea of “protest paradigm” is based on the proposition that the news media reflect the interests of the power structure available at that time (Tuchman, 1981). The “protest paradigm” provides a template for the construction of a protest story. McLeod and Hertog (1998) have classified the characteristics of the “protest paradigm” into the following categories: narrative structures; reliance on official sources and official definitions; the invocation of public opinion; and other techniques of delegitimizing, marginalization, and demonization (Brasted, 2005). The “protest paradigm” was applied to the framing of the student movement and protests of Chicago Democratic Convention that took place in the United State in 1968. The research results showed that the result of using protest paradigm in covering the protests, the dominant narrative structure was of a battle or conflict, official sources were relied on, public opinion was used, and the movement was delegitimized through various framing techniques.

The *narrative structure* is more common to find journalists covering a violent crime story as a battle between protesters and the police rather than an intellectual conflict between the protesters and the government or the chosen target (Brasted, 2005). Accordingly, it is common to find protesters framed as violent and police framed as the victims of this violence.

The media also frames the peaceful protesters as causing *social disorder* which police are doing their best to regain. This is covered through covering the events, rather than the context of these events. Accordingly, the stories would cover how the police were successful in dragging away the protesters from where they were

protesting rather than saying why they actually there. Some researchers such as Carragee (1991) explain that by saying that journalists do so because it is easier for them to report on the story rather than talking about the ideology of the movement and this leaves the public not accepting the movement (Brasted, 2005).

The second “protest paradigm” characteristic is the *reliance on official* sources and official definitions. According to Brasted (2005), as journalists rely on official sources and official definitions of the issue, they support the status quo by telling the story from their perspective rather than from the protesters’ or even giving a platform for both sides.

The *invocation of public opinion* is another protest paradigm. In this characteristic news stories hold cues that show the public support to the status quo or the public against the protest. This can be done through use of bystanders or opinion polls. According to McLeod & Hertog (1992), through this paradigm, the stories portray the protesters as an isolated minority (Brasted, 2005).

Moreover, several characteristics of the protest paradigm can *delegitimize, marginalize, and demonize protesters*. One way to delegitimize protesters is by focusing on the internal divisions of the activists of the movements protesting at that time. Gitlin (1980) has listed several framing devices through which the media delegitimized the movement.

The earliest framing devices from the mid-1960s included:

“• *trivialization* (making light of movement language, dress, age style, and

goals).

- *polarization* (emphasizing counter demonstrations and balancing the antiwar movement against ultra-Right and neo-Nazi groups as equivalent “extremists”).
- emphasis on internal dissension.
- *marginalization* (showing demonstrators to be deviant or unrepresentative).
- disparagement by numbers (under-counting).
- disparagement of the movement’s effectiveness.
- reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities.
- emphasis on the presence of Communists.
- emphasis on the carrying of “Viet Cong” flags.
- delegitimizing the use of quotation marks around terms like “peace march.”
- considerable attention to right-wing oppositions to the movement, especially from the administration and other politicians (pp. 27–28).”

Framing in the Egyptian Press

A study by Shahin (2010) looked at the coverage of Egyptian newspapers of Shura Council elections in 2010. The researcher studied the period between April 1st, 2010 and June 15, 2010. The researcher used both quantitative and qualitative research through content analysis and discourse analysis of all stories covering the Shura elections at that time. The researcher has studied national press, Ahram and Rosalyoussef newspapers, partisan press, Al-Wafd and AlAhali newspapers and independent press, Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7 newspapers. The results show that Al-Ahram was the second newspaper with least stories covering the Shura Council elections. Al-Ahram was also covering the elections using official sources more than any other ones. Al-Ahram supported the regime by offering the stories on the National Democratic Party (NDP) (the ruling party at that time) in a positive tone. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm has included different sources, NDP official in addition to figures from opposition political parties. Al-Masry Al-Youm used the negative tone in its stories about the NDP and the government. This independent newspaper also used the negative tone in describing many opposition parties, except

for one of them for deciding to boycott the elections at that time (Shahin, 2010).

The volume of research into Arab news media – generally referring to news in countries with Arabic as the official or primary language, is small yet, especially when compared to western-based studies. Nonetheless, several scholars (Ayish 2002; 2003; Hafez 2002; Mellor 2005; Rugh 2004; Sakr 2005) have offered important insights into the Arab press which offer a starting point for thinking about future research (ElMasry, 2011).

Cooper's (2008) content analysis of Egyptian newspapers presents findings that suggest specific changes brought on by independent papers. For example, the study found that during the sample period of two-and-a-half years, the independent Al-Masry Al-Youm was more likely than the government-owned Al-Ahram to publish stories about domestic politics, human rights and corruption, and less likely to rely on official sources (Cooper, 2008).

Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) conducted a study to examine how Egypt's state owned newspapers, independent newspapers and a representative sample of social media postings framed the revolution in January and February 2011. A content analysis was used to identify and categorize the way stories were framed in each of these three types of media. The researches focused on the framing of the protests, causes given for the protests, and solutions proposed for ending the crisis. Researches found that the first 18 days of Egypt's January 25 Revolution were framed differently in the different types of press under study. "Indeed if these reports are compared in the semiofficial press and in social media, it would be reasonable to conclude that they were not even covering the same events" (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). The independent newspapers at times shared stories constructed in similar frames with the

state owned newspapers and at times used frames similar to those advanced in social media. As noted earlier, independent newspaper journalists were from the onset courageous in their defiance of the government line. “We found that these newspapers attempted to cover the protests more objectively than either the semiofficial newspapers or the social media. They are not above criticism, but are well positioned to achieve higher standards of journalistic integrity and credibility in the post-Mubarak era.” (p. 18)

Framing the War

Another important area in the research of news framing that was extensively studied especially after 9/11 and the as the “war on terrorism” has started is the framing of wars. There are three main narratives regarding the role of media in covering conflicts: “critical observer, publicist and the surface upon which war is imagined and executed” (Thussu & Freedman, 2003, p.13). Professionally, journalists ought to be impartial and independent monitors of military conduct. This approach encourages that media players should go beyond organizational and ideological restrictions to keep a watchful eye on the activities of the military and the government. There is another model that as journalists being active and act as “watchdog” on the government and the military, that forces them to act better and be more transparent. Thus, the media outlets are competing on the extent each is able to reveal the “truth” on the covered topics. Meanwhile, Naomi Chomsky suggests that media coverage of the war is a notable way to publicize the political and military leaders’ framework of events. They tend to provide propaganda more than accurate reporting (Thussu & Freedman, 2003, p.40).

Vliegenthart and Schroder (2006) conducted a study on the framing of the war on Iraq across four western countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands) newspapers for the period from September 2002 till August 2003. The researchers studied how each country's specific conditions "opportunity structure," newspaper ideology and time elements had an impact on the coverage of each. After analyzing 70,000 articles from 12 different newspapers, the researchers concluded that the cause-frame was the most frequently used in the build up stage to the war, the intervention frame was the most used during the war itself and afterwards was the consequence frame (Vliegenthart & Schroder, 2010).

To answer another important question of whether media frames change over time or are more consistent, Entman (2010) conducted a research on mainstream US media. Through his study he refines the framing theory in a way to provide a theoretical foundation for systematic studies on media bias. According to Entman, framing usually favors one side in their stories over another, even if journalists were keen enough on not doing so. Entman (2010) studied the coverage of 2008 presidential campaign focusing on Sarah Palin, Republican vice presidential nominee. The results have shown that slanted framing shifts over time as the interaction between cultural norms, journalistic decision rules and real world developments change. Entman argues that unbalanced news is not a result of consistent personal ideologies of journalists but rather in the changes of the interactions of the above listed elements (Entman, 2010).

Christie (2006) conducted a study that examines to which extent the US rationale on the war on Iraq affects the public opinion, public policy and mass media agendas. The researcher studied two distinct periods of time, during which there way

high and low public support on the war. The researcher used content analysis of White House briefings, a major TV new network and two major national/international newspapers. The results supported the presence of a relationship between the White House and media agendas on main issues of the war as weapons of mass destruction and terrorism during the period of high public support (Christie, 2006).

In addition to the war on Iraq coverage, other media studies were conducted to study the framing of the “clash of civilizations” sponsored by the international media. La Porte and Azpiroz (2009) conducted a review on symbols and interpretations used by the European media in framing the “clash of civilizations.” They did that by first observing how the “clash of civilizations” is articulated in political discourse and how it is then framed in the leading European media. The newspapers studied were The Guardian, Le Monde and Frankfurter Allgemeine. They have made a comparison between the frames found in political discourses of Bush, Ahmadinejad, Sarkozy and Gul with those encountered in the coverage of the same discourses in the above newspapers. In addition to that, the research explores the process of frame elaboration and the conditions that make political discourse more effective and attractive for the media to assimilate them (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009). The researchers found that political leaders use similar frames during their public speeches and that there is a certain overlap in the values which leaders express (La Porte & Azpiroz, 2009).

Another study of the framing of European politics, Semetko and Valkenburg (2002) have conducted a content analysis of both newspapers and television to find the most used frames in the European media. The researchers have investigated the prevalence of five news frames. Those five news frames investigated are: attribution

of responsibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences and morality. During their study they have used content analysis to analyze 2,061 newspapers' stories and 1,522 television news stories during the period surrounding the Amsterdam meeting of European heads of state in 1997. They have resulted that the attribution of responsibility frame is the most common used one. They have also concluded that the news frames depended on both the type of outlet and the type of topic (Valkenburg, Semetko, & De Vresse, 2002).

Brunken (2006) have conducted a content analysis of print media coverage of government response in case of crisis after Hurricane Katrina. The researcher has analyzed five weeks in four newspapers immediately after the hurricane, looking for common frames, attribute agenda setting, and tone. The researcher has tested Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) common frames: attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, economic consequence and morality frames. Findings indicate that the order of Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) common frames changed across the coverage, human interest was the first frame. Meanwhile, conflict, attribution of responsibility, economic consequences, and morality frames followed. Also, media's tone of government response was moderately neutral with federal tone covered more positively, and local tone covered more negatively.

Media Framing Effects

On the effects of framing on the public opinion, several studies were conducted supporting that the latter are to great extent affected by the frames proposed by the media. Nelson, Oxley and Clawson (1997) in their research "towards a psychology of framing effects," have tried to explain how the media frames affect

public opinion through some focus of psychological mechanisms applied on the media theory of framing effects. They discussed the conceptual difference between theories of persuasion that focus on belief and framing theory. After conducting an experiment, the researchers found out that framing is different from persuasion. News framing can influence attitudes through political communication but don't change the beliefs of the audience as persuasion (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997).

Price V, Tewksbury D, Powers E (1997) have conducted a study research the framing effects on the readers' thoughts and feelings. The researchers have worked on two hundred and seventy-eight students. The participants read and responded to a fictitious story about possible reductions in state funding of their university. The researchers have presented four versions of the same story, all containing the same information, but varying in their opening and closing paragraphs. The difference in the closing and opening was according to the frame employed: human interest, conflict, or personal consequences. They have also made a control version containing the common body. The study was divided into two studies, Study 1, thoughts listed by participants indicated that the news frames significantly affected the topical focus and evaluative implications of thoughts generated. Meanwhile in Study 2, evaluations and opinions offered by participants indicated that the news frames could affect audience decision making about matters of public policy.

On the limitations of framing effects, Druckman (2001) has conducted a study to see the constraints the elites face in shaping the public opinion. Many scholars suggest that media frames are in most cases a construction of political elites (Entman, 1991). Druckman (2001) suggests that elites face few constraints to using frames to influence citizens' opinions. The researcher is testing those limits by focusing on the source credibility frame constraint. He has worked on two laboratory experiments to

answer his research questions. The results suggest that perceived source credibility is an essential prerequisite for successful framing. Through his analysis Druckman argues that framing effects may occur, because citizens delegate to credible elites for guidance and not because elite seek manipulating the public. Accordingly, the researcher suggests that the audience select which frames and which elites to follow in a systematic and a cognitive approach (Druckman, 2001).

Chapter Four

Methodology

This study uses quantitative research, content analysis, in studying the framing of the first 18 days of the Egyptian January 25 revolution in one state owned newspaper and another private owned one.

Research Questions

The researcher believe it is really important to study how the state owned media and the independent media, framed the 18 days of uprising of the Egyptian January 25 revolution. It is known that in time of crisis people turn to the media for explanations, accordingly the researcher thought that those explanations should better be studied. Also the researcher thought that it is very important to see if those frames were consistent or were changed across the coverage of the 18 days of the revolution. The researcher got the newspapers and conducted a pilot study before she has come up with the research questions.

The research questions for this study are based on the findings of the previous research on framing of news coverage and social movements. The analysis was guided by the following research questions:

RQ1: How did the daily newspapers Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm frame the Egyptian revolution?

RQ2: Is the “protest paradigm” used in constructing stories in Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

RQ3: Did the used frames vary throughout the revolution coverage in any of Al-Ahram or Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

Content Analysis

Content analysis methodology is efficient in investigating media content in terms of quantity and quality of content (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). The classical definition of content analysis is: “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables,” as defined by Kerlinger’s (2000) (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). In general, agenda-setting and framing studies rely heavily on content analysis to analyze media content and determine the significance of news subjects. Moreover, content analysis is very useful in studying the changes in media policy towards a certain topic or group, which is one of the concerns of this study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).

Defining the Universe

One of the steps of content analysis is defining the universe, which is vital in identifying the limits of the study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). In this study, the researcher focused on the most popular state owned and private newspapers in Egypt during the Egyptian January 25 revolution in 2011 (ElMasry, 2011). Those two newspapers are Al-Ahram state owned daily newspaper and Al-Masry Al-Youm private owned daily newspaper. It is also important to note that elite newspapers “provide cues to other types of news organizations about what is newsworthy. Their importance therefore extends beyond their own readership to the content of other news media” (Lawrence, 2000).

Unit of Analysis

This study analyzed news stories and political news features that were related to the revolution in addition to the pictures attributed with those stories. Other sections of the newspaper were not studied. The research studied the newspapers' articles during the period from January 25, 2011 till February 11, 2011. Those days were chosen, as they mark the 18 days of the uprising of January 25 Revolution.

Newspapers' portrayal of the revolution

This refers to the revolution frames covered by newspapers under study. The issue examined is the Egyptian January 25 revolution in 2011. The newspapers' frames of this revolution are listed in the content analysis codebook.

Variables and operationalization of frames

The coding categories included standard variables such as the name of the publication, the story type and the date published. The coders also examined the material for uses of various frames through checking for phrases, headlines and portrayals of events in news accounts. The study searches different frames based on previous research, (Entman, 1993) to see whether they were applied or not during the coverage of the revolution.

Definition of the problem frame: is the frame that describes how each news story has framed the problem (protests).

Framing of the main actors of the revolution: the researcher set the main actors of the revolution as the protesters, the former president Hosni Mubarak, the police and the army.

Causality frame: is the frame that describes reasons for the revolution to take place.

Moral judgment frame: is the frame which holds responsibility of the problem to someone or something. It tests whether the story has someone or something responsible for the revolution and if yes, who that someone or something is.

Suggested remedies to the problem frame: is the frame that gives solutions to the reader as a way out of the problem. It tests whether the story offered a solution or not and if yes, what this solution is.

Protest paradigm frame: is a frame suggested by previous research that says the media will take the side of the regime in covering protest. Accordingly, the dominant narrative structure will be of a battle or conflict, official sources will be relied on, public opinion will be used, and the movement (protesters) will be delegitimized through various framing techniques.

Narrative structure theme: this theme involves either framing the protests as a battle versus a conflict, events versus issues, the use of warfare metaphors, attributing protesters to violent actions. In structuring the narrative of the stories using a battle theme, the majority of stories emphasized events rather than issues by detailing the happenings on the street and not the reasons for these events. In using warfare metaphors the story would frame protesters with violent actions and use words that emphasis a war as fire, tear gas, throwing rock, attacking police and breaking windows.

Social order theme: in this theme, protesters are portrayed as a threat to the social order by attacking police, breaking windows and throwing stones. Meanwhile

police is framed as maintaining the social order and protecting and doing their job. This frame also tests whether the story refers to the protesters as antagonists; protesters refuse to leave Tahrir Square after police warned them, protesters verbally assaulted the police, protesters physically assaulted the police, protesters burning cars or protesters are looting any of the shops or buildings in the streets. It also tests whether there is mention of media blockage; the story includes any of the following: security smash into media offices, arrest of journalists and labeling media sources. Moreover, it tests whether the protests portrayed as a threat to social disorder; the story contains praise for police for doing their duty or there is a mention of planned disruption.

Reliance on official sources theme: in this frame the majority of news stories are told by the official sources' perspective rather than the protesters' one. Those inquiries are answered to make this theme: whether the story gives explanation to the demonstrators' point of view, the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story, the story gives explanation to an official point of view and whether the story emphasis on internal dissent and disparagement of the movement's future effectiveness are framing methods that can result in the delegitimizing of the movement.

Delegitimizing of protesters frame: it tests whether several characteristics of the protest paradigm can delegitimize, marginalize and demonize protesters. It tests whether the story mentions: trivialization of the protesters (trivialization of the movement can include making light of movement language, dress, age, style, and goals), polarization of protesters, emphasis on internal dissension, marginalization;

showing protestors to be deviant or unrepresentative, disparagement by numbers, disparagement of the movement's effectiveness, reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities, emphasis on the presence of Communists, delegitimizing the use of quotation marks and considerable attention to right-wing oppositions to the protestors (e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood).

Intercoder Reliability

Ten percent of the sample was re-coded by another coder, who has a mass communication masters degree. After completing the coding process, the researcher calculated intercoder reliability. According to Holsti (1969), the intercoder reliability can be measured through the following formula:

$$\text{Reliability} = 2M/(N1+N2) \times 100$$

With reference to the formula above, "M is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agreed on, N1 and N2 are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coders" (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Applying Holsti's formula on this research, there were 6025 coding decisions, and the two coders agreed on 5900 of those decisions, as explained below:

$$\text{Reliability} = 2(5900)/6025+6025 \times 100 = 97.5\%$$

Chapter Five

Results

The results of this study are divided into three phases; phase one: January 25 to January 28; phase two: January 29 to February 2; and phase three: February 3 to February 11. Those periods represent transitional phases during the 18 days of uprising that ended by former President Hosni Mubarak handing over power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11. Those phases represent shifts that affected the perception of the people and the media of the regime and the revolution.

Phase one: January 25 to January 28

Phase one in the study consists of the first four days of Egypt's January 25 Revolution. This phase contains 43 articles in Al-Ahram newspaper and 48 articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper. It starts on January 25th, 2011 the first day of protests and ends on 28th of the same month.. This phase describes the first four days of the revolution, during which nearly no one was seeing it as a revolution but rather protests and the regime was acting with full control. No changes in ministers had taken place yet.

RQ1: How did the daily newspapers' Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm frame the Egyptian revolution?

Definition of the problem frame




Table 1- Phase one: definition of the problem

According to (Table 1), the problem during this period was the “protests” which turned into a revolution. So the definition of the problem is how each newspaper framed the protests. During the first four days of the revolution, Al-Ahram newspaper referred to the protests as riots (shaghab) in 18 (41.9%) stories, as protests (mozaharat) in 24 (55.8%) stories, as others in one (2.3%) story. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper referred to the protests as riots in 3 (6.3 %) stories, as protests in 43 (88.9 %) stories, both unrest and youth revolution were mentioned in one story each (2.1 %).

The framing of main actors of the revolution

In framing the main actors of the revolution, the protesters, former President Hosni Mubarak, the police and the army were as the main actors. The next paragraphs will explain the framing of each actor in the two newspapers during phase one.

Protesters




Table 2- Phase one: framing of protesters

As seen in (Table 2) Al-Ahram state owned newspaper framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 8 (16.7%) stories, as youth 8 (16.7%) stories, as violent protesters in 11 (22.9%) stories, as others in 10 (20.8%), as both liberals and following foreign agendas in one (2.1%) story and they were not framed at all in 9 (18.8%) stories. That shows that the most common framing of protesters in Al-Ahram was as violent. Meanwhile private owned, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper has framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 5 (9.6%) of the stories, as youth in 6 (11.5%), as violent in 10 (19.2%) of stories, as peaceful protesters in 1 (1.9%) of stories, as liberals in 3 (5.8%) of stories, as workers in 6 (11.5%) of stories and as others in 17 (32.7%) of stories. Also most common framing of protesters in Al-Masry Al-Youm was also violent.

Former President Hosni Mubarak

Al-Ahram has only mentioned former president Hosni Mubarak in 2 (4.7%) stories and has framed him as patriotic. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper did not mention former President Hosni Mubarak in any news stories during phase one under study.

The Police




Table 3- Phase one: framing of the police

As seen in (Table3) Al-Ahram newspaper framed the police during the first phase of the revolution as *keeping social order* in 28 (65.1%) stories and as *violent* in one (2.3%) story. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed the police during the first phase of the revolution as *keeping social order* in 6 (12.5%) stories, as *violent* in 17 (35.4%) stories and as *neutral* in one (2.1%) story.

The Army

Both newspapers, Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm didn't mention the army during the first period of study.

The diagnosis of the problem (causality framing)




Table 4- Phase one: the causality frame

As seen in (Table 4) Al-Ahram newspaper used the causality frame during phase one of the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributing it to corruption in 12 (17.1 %) stories, to poverty in 14 (20%) stories, to unemployment in 14 (20%) stories, to foreign agendas in 4 (5.7%) stories, to dictatorship in 4 (5.7%) stories, to emergency law in 2 (2.9%) stories, to employment problems in 1 (1.4%) stories and to other reasons in 2 (2.9%) stories. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper used the causality frame during phase one of the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributing it to corruption in 9 (13.2%) stories, to poverty in 13 (19.1%) stories, to unemployment in 9 (13.2%) stories, to dictatorship in 3 (4.4%) stories, to emergency law in 5 (7.4%) stories, to police brutality in 1 (1.5%) story, to employment problems in 7 (10.3%) stories and to other reasons in 4 (5.9%) stories.

The Moral Judgments

Al-Ahram newspaper's moral judgment frame during the first phase of the revolution, was putting the responsibility on the government in 15 (34.9%) of stories,

13 (30.2%) on the activists', 4 (9.3%) of responsibility was put on others. Meanwhile, for Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper's moral judgment frame during the first period of the revolution has put the responsibility on the government in 10 (20.8%) of stories, on activists in 3 (6.3%) stories and on Mubarak's regime in 3 (6.3%) stories.

The Suggested Remedies in the story for the situation

Rarely did Al-Ahram newspaper suggest remedies for the problem during its coverage in the first phase. It mentioned abolition of emergency law in 3 (6.4%) of stories, mentioned only one time (2.1%) dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council, release of those detained since January 25, investigation with those responsible for the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since January 25 and issuing the law that gives the right to form political parties. Al-Masry Al-Youm rarely suggested solutions to the problem in phase one. It suggested abolition of emergency law in 2 (4%) stories and only one time (2%) dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council.

Using the above results to answer RQ1 for phase one, the most common frames used by Al-Ahram during covering phase one were, defining the problem as riots, framing protesters as violent, framing police as keeping social order. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to corruption, poverty and unemployment, moral judgment was attributed to both the government and the activists and remedies to the problem were rarely given. The most common frames used by Al-Masry Al-Youm during covering phase one were, defining the problem as protests, framing protesters as other, framing police as violent. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to poverty, corruption and employment problems, moral judgment was attributed to the government and remedies to the problem were rarely given.

RQ2: Is the protest paradigm used to construct the stories in Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

To answer the following question the study tests the protest paradigm and whether is used or not by any of the newspapers under study.




Table 5 - Phase one: protest paradigm

Using Table 5 to answer RQ2 for phase one. Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm in phase one. Al-Ahram framed the protests as a battle, conflict, event, used war fare metaphors, framed protesters as breaking the law, framed protesters as antagonists, never mentioned media blockage by the government, framed protests as a threat to social order, used the public opinion to support its stand from the protests, rarely mentioned demonstrators point of view, rarely quoted protesters, commonly mentioned the official point of view and delegitimized the protesters. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the protests as a battle, event, used war fare metaphors, rarely framed protesters as breaking the law, didn't frame them as antagonists, commonly demonstrated protesters point of view, commonly quoted protesters and gave official point of view and rarely delegitimized the protesters.

Does the story emphasize a battle? (Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm)

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram described the events as a battle in 15 (34.9%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as a battle in 21 (43.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize a conflict?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram described the events as a conflict in 23 (53.5%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as a conflict 10 (20.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize events?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram described the events as an event in 34 (79.1%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an event 41 (85.4%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize issue?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram described the events as an issue in 8 (18.6%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an issue 5 (10.4%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story use warfare metaphors?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram used warfare metaphors in 17 (39.5%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm used warfare metaphors in 20 (41.7%) of its stories during the same period.

Are protesters described as breaking the law?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram framed protesters as breaking the law in 23 (53.5%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as breaking the law in 15 (31.3%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story refer to the protesters as antagonists?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram framed protesters as antagonists in 24 (55.8%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as antagonists in 3 (6.1%) of its stories during the same period.

Media blockage

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram never mentioned media blockage in its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned media blockage in only 2 (7.4%) of its stories during the same period.

Protests Threat Social Disorder

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper framed protests as a threat to social order in 24 (55.8%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed protests as a threat to social order in 8 (16.7%) of its stories during the same period.

Public's support of the current regime and/or the police

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 35 (81.4%) of its stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 3 (6.3%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to the demonstrators' point of view?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 5 (11.6%) stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 30 (62.5%) stories during the same period.

Are the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 6 (14%) stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 21 (43.8%) stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to an official point of view?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 33 (76.7%) stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 20 (41.7%) stories during the same period.

Delegitimizing of protesters

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper delegitimizes protesters in 23 (53.5%) stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper delegitimizes protesters in 9 (18.8%) stories during the same period.

Does the story contain pictures?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper had 15 (34.9%) stories containing pictures during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper had 37 (77.1%) stories with pictures during the same period.

Size of the picture: bigger than one column?

As seen in (Table 5) Al-Ahram newspaper had 13 (30.2%) of the pictures used with the stories studied larger than one column during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper had 26 (54.2%) of the pictures used with the stories studied larger than one column during the same period.

Phase two: January 29 to February 2

Phase two of the study starts on January 29 and ends on February 2. This constitutes five days during the 18 days of the uprising of January 25 Revolution. It consists of 74 stories in Al-Ahram and 60 stories in Al-Masry Al-Youm. During this period, the police had pulled out of the streets and the army took over. The former president was trying to remain in power by making major changes in the cabinet and assigning a vice president to himself. The streets of Cairo were full of looting and fear as some prisons and police stations were opened in the middle of the security vacuum. During that period protests have also intensified, taking Tahrir Square as the main protesting spot.



Figure 1 - Al-Ahram January 30, 2011

أخبار مصر | عرب وعالم | اقتصاد | رياضة | حوادث | علوم وتكنولوجيا | فنون | ثقافة | وسط الزحمة | رأي | منوعات | محافظات | تلفزيون المصري اليوم | صور | كاريكاتير

الانتقال الى | اختر صفحة | الرجوع لعدد اليوم | اعداد سابقة | أختار العدد

مؤامرة من «الأمن» لدعم سيناريو الفوضى



قرر الرئيس مبارك تعيين اللواء عمر سليمان، نائباً لرئيس الجمهورية، وأدى سليمان اليمين الدستورية أمام الرئيس أمس بمقر رئاسة الجمهورية، كما كلف مبارك الفريق أحمد شفيق بتشكيل الحكومة الجديدة. من جهة أخرى، علّمت «المصري اليوم» أن مسؤولاً أمنياً رفيع المستوى أصدر أوامره لجميع قطاعات وزارة الداخلية بإخلاء مواقعهم، والانسحاب من الشوارع والمقار ونقاط التفتيش والمرور، وترك أقسام الشرطة، في الوقت الذي كشف فيه شهود عيان عن قيام عناصر أمنية بإحراق عدد من أقسام الشرطة. وقال مصدر أمني إن هناك جهة أمنية تابعة لوزارة الداخلية فرضت كلمتها على خطة الوزارة، وقررت الانسحاب ودعم سيناريو الفوضى، وإطلاق سراح المساجين والبلطجية والمسجلين خطر، والمساعدة في أعمال التخريب والنهب عبر غض الطرف عنها. وأضاف المصدر أن هناك روحاً...

المواضيع الرئيسية

- رسالة من المجر
- إخبار الوطن
- رياضة
- اقتصاد
- مساحة رأي
- ملف خاص
- إخبار العالم
- حوادث وقضايا
- السكوت مميوم
- زى النهارده

Figure 2 - Al-Masry Al-Youm on January 30, 2011.

According to figures 1 and 2, also the two newspapers gives different frames to the events. Al-Ahram was praising the things Mubarak did to fulfill people's enough and frame protests as a threat to the country. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm reveals the security vacuum conspiracy to the reader. Al-Ahram didn't mention till phase three the security vacuum.

RQ1: How did the daily newspapers' Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm frame the Egyptian revolution?

Definition of the problem frame




Table 6 - Phase two: definition of the problem frame

The problem during this period was the “protests” which turned into a revolution. So the definition of the problem is how each newspaper framed the protests. During the second phase of the revolution, Al-Ahram newspaper has referred to the protests as riots (shaghab) in 39 (43.8%) of stories, as uprising (intifada) in 2 (2.2%) of stories, as protests (mozaharat) in 40 (44.9%) of stories, peaceful revolution (sawra selmia) in 4(4.5%) of stories and as others in 4 (4.5%) of stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper referred to the protests as riots in 1 (1.4%) of stories, as uprising in 2 (2.7%) of stories, as protests in 67 (90.5 %) of stories, as unrest in 2 (2.7%) and both youth revolution and others were mentioned in one story each (1.4%). Accordingly, during the second phase, Al-Masry Al-Youm acknowledged the uprising as protests, while still Al-Ahram still framed it in more than 40% of stories as riots.

The framing of main actors in the revolution

Protesters




Table 7 - Phase two: framing of protesters

As seen in (table 7) Al-Ahram state owned newspaper framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 6 (6.5%) stories, as youth in 17 (18.3%) stories, as violent protesters in 20 (21.5%) stories, as others in 35 (37.6%) and as both peaceful and following foreign agendas in one (1.1%) story. That shows that the most common framing of protesters in Al-Ahram was violent. Private owned, Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 2 (2.7%) of the stories, as youth in 5 (6.8%), as violent in 14 (18.9%) of stories, as peaceful, secular, following foreign agendas and liberal in 1 (1.9%) of stories, and as others in 40 (54.1%) of stories. The most common framing of protesters in Al-Masry Al-Youm was a combination of miscellaneous terms followed by as “violent.”

Former President Hosni Mubarak

Al-Ahram framed former President Hosni Mubarak during phase two as patriotic in 1 (1.1%) story, as other in 2 (2.2%) stories and wasnt mentioned at all in 86 (96.6%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed former President Hosni Mubarak during the second phase as father of the nation in 1 (1.4%) story, in denial in 4 (5.4%) stories, convenient in 3 (4.1%) stories, failure in 1 (1.4%) story, other in 1 (1.4%) story, and not mentioned at all in 64 (86.5%) of stories.

The Police




Table 8- Phase two: framing of the police

As seen in (Table 8) Al-Ahram newspaper framed the police during the second phase of the period studied in the revolution as victims in 3 (3.4%) stories, as keeping social order in 26 (29.2%) stories, as violent in 3 (3.4%) stories, as other in 2 (2.2%) stories and have not mentioned the police at all in 54 (60.7%) of stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed the police during the second phase of the period studied in

the revolution as keeping social order in 3 (4.1%) stories, as violent in 35 (47.3%) of stories, as neutral in 1 (1.4%) and not mentioned at all in 34 (45.9 %) of the stories.

The Army

Both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers had started framing of the army during phase two in the period studied in the revolution. It framed the army as keeping social order in 17 (19.1%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed of the army during phase two in the period studied in the revolution as keeping social order in 18 (24.3%) stories.

The diagnoses of the problem (causality framing)




Table 9 - Phase two: the causality frame

As seen in (Table 9) Al-Ahram newspaper used the causality frame during phase two of the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributing it to corruption in 29 (20.9%) stories, to poverty in 27 (19.4%) stories, to unemployment in 13 (9.4%) stories, to foreign agendas 2 (1.4%) stories, to dictatorship in 9 (6.5%) stories and to other reasons 11 (7.9%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper used the causality

frame during phase one of the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributing it to corruption in 9 (11%) stories, to poverty in 7 (8.5%) stories, to unemployment in 2 (2.4%) stories, to dictatorship in 3 (3.7%) stories, to emergency law in 1 (1.2%) story, to police brutality in 1 (1.2%) story, to Gamal Mubarak gaining more power in 1 (1.2%) story and not mentioned at all in 58 (70.7%).

The Moral Judgments

Al-Ahram newspaper's moral judgment frame during the second period of the revolution attributed in 36 (40.4%) stories for the government responsibility, 12 (13.5%) the activists' responsibility, 1 (1.1%) media responsibility, 1 (1.1%) for Mubarak's regime, 14 (15.7%) responsibility was given to others and not mentioned at all in 25 (28.1%). Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper's moral judgment frame during the second period under study of the revolution attributed in 5 (6.8%) stories for the government responsibility, 2 (2.7%) the activists' responsibility, 1 (1.4%) NDP responsibility, 17 (23%) Mubarak's regime's responsibility and not mentioned at all in 49 (66.2%) of stories.

The Suggested Remedies in the story for the situation

Al-Ahram newspaper's suggested remedies mentioned in the story to solve the current problem, in 1 (1.1%) of stories President Muhamed Hosni Mubarak steps down, in 2 (2.2%) of stories dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council, in 19 (20.9 %) of stories as other and not mentioned at all in 69 (75.8%) of stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper's suggested remedies mentioned in the story to solve the current problem, in 10 (13%) of stories President Hosni Mubarak steps down, in 1 (1.3%) of stories abolition of emergency law, in 3 (3.9%) of stories dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council, in 1 (1.3%) of stories investigation with

those responsible for the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since January 25, in 1 (1.3%) of stories issuing the law that gives the right to form political parties, in 4 (5.2%) of stories as other and not mentioned at all in 55 (71.4%) of stories.

Using the above results to answer RQ1 for phase two, the most common frames used by Al-Ahram were, defining the problem as protests and riots, framing protesters as Muslim Brotherhoods and violent, neither mentioning Mubarak nor the army, framing police as keeping social order. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to poverty and unemployment, but most commonly not framed, moral judgment was attributed to both government and the activists and remedies to the problem were rarely given. The most common frame used by Al-Masry Al-Youm during covering phase two were, defining the problem as protests, framing protesters as a mix of miscellaneous actors and workers, neither framing Mubarak nor the army, framing the police as violent. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to poverty, moral judgment to the government and remedies to the problem were rarely given. Al-Masry Al-Youm used causality frame, moral judgment frame very rare in comparison to phase one.

The Protest Paradigm




Table 10 - Phase two: protest paradigm

Using Table 10 to answer RQ2 for phase two. Al-Ahram framed the protests as a battle, conflict, event, used war fare metaphors, framed protesters as breaking the law, framed protesters as antagonists, rarely mentioned media blockage by the government, used the public opinion to support its stand from the protests, rarely mentioned demonstrators point of view, rarely quoted protesters, commonly mentioned the official point of view and delegitimized the protesters. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the protests as a battle, event, used war fare metaphors, sometimes framed protesters as breaking the law, sometimes framed protesters as antagonists, commonly demonstrated protesters point of view, commonly quoted protesters and gave official point of view and sometimes delegitimized the protesters.

Does the story emphasize battle?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram described the events as a battle in 37 (41.6%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-

Masry Al-Youm described the events as a battle 28 (37.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize conflict?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram described the events as a conflict in 51 (57.3%) stories during the first phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm didn't describe the events as a conflict in its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize events?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram described the events as an event in 81 (91%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an event 59 (79.7%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize issue?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram described the events as an issue in 81 (91%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an issue in 9 (12.2%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story use of warfare metaphors?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram used warfare metaphors in 34 (38.2%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm used warfare metaphors in 23 (31.1%) of its stories during the same period.

Are protesters described as breaking the law?

Al-Ahram framed protesters as breaking the law in 34 (37.1%) of its stories during the second phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as breaking the law in 23 (21.6%) of its stories during the same period.

Social order theme

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram framed protesters as antagonists in 44 (49.4%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied in the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as antagonists in 15 (20.3%) of its stories during the same period.

Mention of media blockage

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram mentioned media blockage in 3 (3.4%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned media blockage in 7 (9.5%) of its stories during the same period.

Public Opinion theme

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 40 (50.6%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 8 (10.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to the demonstrators' point of view?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 8 (9%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 42 (56.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Are the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 3 (3.4%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 25 (33.8%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to an official point of view?

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 57 (64%) of its stories during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 11 (14.9%) of its stories during the same period.

Delegitimizing of protesters

As seen in (Table 10) Al-Ahram newspaper delegitimized protesters in 43 (48.3%) of its stories during the second phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper delegitimizes protesters in 20 (27%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story contain pictures?

Al-Ahram newspaper had 42 (47.2%) of the studied stories contain pictures during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper had 62 (83.8%) stories with pictures during the same period.

Size of the picture: bigger than one column?

Al-Ahram newspaper had 36 (40.4%) of the pictures used with the stories studied larger than one column during the second phase of the period studied during the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper had 50 (67.6%) of the pictures used with the stories studied larger than one column during the same period.

Phase three: February 3 to February 11

Phase three consists of 9 days, 138 articles in Al-Ahram newspaper and 66 articles in Al-Masry Al-Youm. This phase started after the battle of the camel and ended on the day Former President Hosni Mubarak steps down. This phase was the starting point of the state owned media inclination towards protesters.



Figure 3 - Al-Ahram newspaper on February 3, 2011.



Figure 4 Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper on February 3, 2011

According to the above screen shots in figure 3 & 4, Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm covered the battle of the camel with different angels. Al-Ahram supporting the regime and Al-Masry to good extent supports the revolutionaries.

RQ1: How did the most popular daily newspapers' Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm frame the Egyptian revolution?

Definition of the problem frame




Table 11 - Phase three: the definition of the problem frame

As seen in (Table 11) during the third phase of the revolution, Al-Ahram newspaper referred to the protests as riots (shaghab) in 23 (16.7%) stories, as uprising (intifada) in 4 (2.9%) stories, as protests (mozaharat) in 72 (52.2%) stories, as youth revolution 5 (3.6%), as revolution 21 (15.2%) and as others in 11 (8%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper referred to the protests as protests in 58 (87.9%) stories, as youth revolution 1 (1.5%), as revolution 5 (7.6%) and as other in 2 (3%) stories.

The framing of main actors in the revolution

Protesters




Table 12 - Phase three: framing of protesters

As seen in (Table 12) Al-Ahram state owned newspaper framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 4 (2.8%) stories, as youth in 57 (40.4%) stories, as violent protesters in 1 (0.7%) story, as peaceful in 1 (0.7%) and as others. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed the protesters as members of the Muslim Brotherhood group in 5 (7.6%) of the stories, as youth in 5 (7.6%), as violent in 6 (9.1%) of stories, as peaceful in 1 (1.5%) of stories, as following foreign agendas in 1 (1.5%), as workers in 23 (34.8%) of stories, and as others in 24 (36.4%) of stories.

Hosni Mubarak

Al-Ahram framed former President Hosni Mubarak during phase three, in 3 (2.2%) stories was framed as the father of the nation, in 26 (18.8%) stories was framed as patriotic, in 1 (0.7%) story framed as in denial, in 1 (0.7%) story framed as failure, in 17 (12.3%) stories as other and in 90 (65.2%) stories he was not mentioned

at all. Al-Masry Al-Youm's framing former President Hosni Mubarak during phase three, in 9 (13.6%) stories he was framed as the father of the nation, in 3 (4.5%) stories as patriotic, in 1 (1.5%) story as convenient, in 3 (4.5%) story as failure, in 3 (4.5%) story as other and not mentioned at all in 47 (71.2 %) stories.

The Police




Table 13 - Phase three: framing of the police

As seen in (Table 13) Al-Ahram newspaper framed the police during the third phase of the revolution, as keeping social order in 8 (5.8%) stories, framed as violent in 4 (2.9%) stories, as other in 1 (0.7%) stories and not mentioned at all in 124 (89.9 %) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed the police during the third phase of the revolution as keeping social order in 5 (7.6%) of stories, as violent in 4 (6.1%) of stories, and not mentioned at all in 57 (86.4 %) of stories.

The Army

Al-Ahram newspaper's framed the army during phase three as keeping social order in (5.1%) of stories, as defending the revolutionaries/revolution in (1.4%) of stories and not mentioned at all (93.5%) of stories. Meanwhile, Al-Masry Al-Youm

newspaper's framed the army during phase three as keeping social order (16.7%) of stories and didn't mention them at all in (83.3%) of stories.

The diagnoses of the problem (causality framing)




Table 14 - Phase three: causality frame

As seen in (Table 14) Al-Ahram newspaper used the causality frame during phase three of the period studied in the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributed it to corruption in 52 (32.9%) stories, to poverty in 6 (3.8%) stories, to unemployment in 6 (3.8%) stories, to foreign agendas in 14 (8.9%) stories, to police brutality in 1 (0.6) story, to others in 10 (6.3%) stories and gave no reasons in 68 (43%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper used the causality frame during phase three of the period studied in the Egyptian January 25 revolution, attributed it to corruption as a reason in 3 (4.5%) stories, to poverty in 1 (1.5%) story, to police brutality 1 (1.5%) story, to media responsibility in 1 (1.5%) story, to Gamal Mubarak gaining power in 1 (1.5%) story, to employment problems in 20 (30.5%) stories and didn't mention at all in 38 (57.6%) stories.

The Moral Judgments

Al-Ahram newspaper moral judgment frame during the third period of the revolution, making government responsibility in 67 (48.6%) stories, the activists' responsibility in 18 (13%) stories, media responsibility in 10 (7.2%) stories, Mubarak's regime responsibility in 8 (5.8%) stories, responsibility was given to others in 2 (1.4%) stories and no moral judgment was given in 33 (23.9%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper's moral judgment frame during the third period of the revolution, making the activists' responsibility in 2 (3%) stories, making NDP responsibility frame in 1 (1.5%) story, Mubarak's regime responsibility frame in 5 (7.6%) stories and responsibility was given to others in 5 (7.6%) stories and not giving any responsibility frame in 53 (80%) stories.

The Suggested Remedies in the story for the situation

Al-Ahram newspaper's suggested remedies mentioned in the story to solve the current problem were that Mubarak steps down in 9 (6.1%) stories, abolition of emergency law in 2 (1.4%) stories, abolition of state security investigation in 1 (0.7%) story, dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council, investigation with those responsible for the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since January 25 in 2 (1.4%) stories, protesters leave Tahrir Square and go back to normal life in 11 (7.5%) stories, other in 49 (33.3%) stories and not mentioned at all in 58 (39.5%) stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper's suggested remedies mentioned in the story to solve the current problem, Mubarak steps down in 15 (22.4%) stories, abolition of state security investigation, dissolving both the people's assembly and Shura Council, release of those detained since January 25, investigation with those responsible for the

use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since January 25 in 1 (1.5%) story, as other in 12 (17.9%) stories and not mentioned at all in 36 (53.7%) stories.

Using the above results to answer RQ1 for phase three, the most common frames used by Al-Ahram were, defining the problem as protests and riots, framing protesters as a mix of miscellaneous actors and violent, didn't mention Mubarak, framing police as keeping social order and framing the army as keeping social order as well. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to corruption, and most commonly not framed, moral judgment was attributed to both government and remedies to the problem were rarely given. The most common frame used by Al-Masry Al-Youm during covering phase three were, defining the problem as protests, framing protesters as a mix of miscellaneous actors and violent, did not frame Mubarak, framing the police as violent and framed the army as keeping social order. Moreover, causality frame was attributed to corruption, moral judgment to Mubarak's regime and remedies to the problem were rarely given and when given the solution was that Mubarak leaves power.

RQ2: Is the protest paradigm used to construct the stories in Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

The Protest Paradigm




Table 15 - Phase three: protest paradigm

Using Table 15 to answer RQ2 for phase three. Al-Ahram framed the protests as a conflict, event, rarely used war fare metaphors, did not frame protesters as breaking the law, mentioned media blockage, framed protesters as antagonists, used the public opinion to support its stand from the protests, rarely mentioned demonstrators point of view, rarely quoted protesters, commonly mentioned the official point of view and rarely delegitimized the protesters. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the protests as a battle, event, rarely used war fare metaphors, sometimes framed protesters as breaking the law, sometimes framed protesters as antagonists, commonly demonstrated protesters point of view, commonly quoted protesters and

gave official point of view and delegitimized the protesters more than it did in phase one and two.

Does the story emphasize a battle?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram described the events as a battle in 13 (9.4%) stories during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as a battle in 13 (19.7%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize conflict?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram described the events as a conflict in 125 (90.6%) stories during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm never described the events as a conflict during the same period.

Does the story emphasize events ?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram described the events as an event in 137 (99.3%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an event 57 (86.4%) of its stories during the same period.

Does the story emphasize issue?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram described the events as an issue in 1 (0.7%) story during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm described the events as an issue in 1 (1.5%) story during the same period.

Does the story use of warfare metaphors

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram used warfare metaphors in 4 (2.9%) stories during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm used warfare metaphors in 10 (15.2%) stories during the same period.

Are protesters described as breaking the law?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram framed protesters as breaking the law in 2 (1.4%) stories during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as breaking the law in 14 (21.2%) stories during the same period.

Does the story refer to the protesters as antagonists?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram framed protesters as antagonists in 1 (0.7%) story during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed protesters as antagonists in 5 (7.6%) stories during the same period.

Mention of media blockage

Al-Ahram has mentioned media blockage in 19 (13.8%) stories during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned media blockage in 3 (4.5%) stories during the same period.

Protests Threat Social Disorder

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper framed protests as a threat to social order in 60 (43.5%) of its stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper framed protests as a threat to social order in 10 (15.2%) stories during the same period.

Public's support of the current regime

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 63 (45.7%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper showed the public's support of the current regime or the police in 14 (21.2%) stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to the demonstrators' point of view?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 51 (37%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-

Youm newspaper gave explanation to the demonstrators' point of view in 62 (93.9%) stories during the same period.

Are the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 27 (26.8%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper quoted heads of demonstrators or individual ones in 37 (56.1%) stories during the same period.

Does the story give explanation to an official point of view?

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 77 (55.8%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper gave explanation to an official point of view in 11 (16.7%) stories during the same period.

Delegitimizing of protesters

As seen in (Table 15) Al-Ahram newspaper delegitimizes protesters in 20 (14.5%) stories during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper delegitimizes protesters in 33 (50%) stories during the same period.

Pictures

Does the story contain pictures?

Al-Ahram newspaper had 87 (63%) stories contain pictures during the third phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper had 54 (81.8%) stories with pictures during the same period.

Size of the picture: bigger than one column?

Al-Ahram newspaper used 68 (49.3%) pictures with the stories larger than one column during the third phase of the revolution. Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper

used 38 (57.6%) pictures with the stories studied larger than one column during the same period.

RQ3: Did the used frames vary throughout the revolution coverage in any of Al-Ahram or Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

For Al-Ahram, the most common frames used were defining the problem as riots in phase one, then riots and protests in phase two and three with a higher percentage to protests during phase three. Framing protesters as violent, then as members of Muslim Brotherhood and violent in phase two, then as a mix of miscellaneous actors and violent in phase three. Framing of the police, Mubarak and the army didn't change along the three phases. Moreover, causality frame didn't change along the three phases, it remained attributed to corruption, poverty and unemployment. Moral judgment was attributed to both the government and the activists in phase one and two, but has changed in phase three as the Al-Ahram took the side of protesters, it was attributed to the government only. During the three phases rarely any remedies were given to the problem. Regarding the protest paradigm used, Al-Ahram has only changed in framing protesters as antagonists, in delegitimizing protesters in phase three. But from phase one to two frames did not change.

For Al-Masry Al-Youm, the definition of the problem didn't vary along the coverage period, it remained protests in the three phases. The framing of the main actors changed along the three phases. The protesters were framed as a mix of miscellaneous actors in phase one, as a mix of miscellaneous actors and workers and as a mix of miscellaneous actors and violent in phase three, something that shows that

Al-Masry Al-Youm inclined to be against the revolution during phase three. The framing of the police didn't change, it was violent during the three phase. Mubarak and the army were not framed during the three phase, which shows the red lines of the newspaper. The causality frame varied along the period of the revolution, in phase one it was attributed to poverty, corruption and employment problems, phase two was attributed mostly to poverty and in phase three was attributed mostly to corruption. Excluding poverty and employment problems from the causality frame gives less power to the revolution. Moral judgment was attributed to the government in phase one and two and was rarely used in phase three. Remedies to the problem were rarely given in phase one and two and in phase three Mubarak leaves power was given as a solution to the problem. Regarding the protest paradigm used, Al-Masry Al-Youm only changed in framing protesters as breaking the law in phase three, only framed protesters as antagonists in phase three and delegitimized protesters more phase two more than one and in phase three more than in phase two. This indicates that Al-Masry Al-Youm took steps away of supporting the revolution during phase three.

Chapter Six

Discussion

“Authoritarian regimes of course try to restrict and control thought and its expression” (Chomski, 2011).

The framing of the 18 days of uprising of the Egyptian revolution had gone through different phases throughout its coverage. During the period of study (January 25 till February 11) 241 news stories were studied in Al-Ahram newspaper and 174 stories studied in Al-Masry Al-Youm. Al-Ahram newspaper generally consists of more pages than Al-Masry Al-Youm. (Usually the number of pages of Al-Ahram varies from one issue to another depending on the day and the number of ads published.)

The framing of each newspaper of the revolution was somehow different but not as expected. While Al-Ahram represents the state owned media, which is known for being the mouthpiece of the government and Al-Masry Al-Youm being the private/independent paper counted as taking the side of the revolutionaries, the results show that the framing gap between both newspapers was not as wide as expected, especially during the last couple of days of the revolution. Results also show that the type of media ownership has played a significant role in the type of frames used by each during the revolution.

Starting with days before January 25, 2011, Al-Ahram has not mentioned any news stories about the calls for a protest on January 25, yet Al-Masry Al-Youm has mentioned them. This shows that Al-Ahram newspaper excludes news that it considers against the regime.

Phase one: January 25 to January 28

Al-Ahram marginalized both protesters and the incident to a great extent during its coverage of the revolution. It rarely reported a balanced story, where there are quotes from protesters or where the opinion of protesters is explained. In phase one of the study, Al-Ahram mentioned the word protest in only 43 articles of its stories during the first four days. This is too little especially when compared to Al-Masry Al-Youm which consists of fewer pages. Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned the word protest in 48 articles. For example, if we compared phases one with phase 3, we will find that Al-Ahram had 138 stories on protest and Al-Masry Al-Youm had only 66 ones on the same topic. This shows that Al-Ahram mentioned protests to the minimum intentionally at the early days of the events.

During the first phase Al-Ahram framed the problem as riots in 42% stories, protesters as violent in 23% of stories and as Muslim Brotherhoods in 17%, police as keeping social order in 65% of stories, causality frame as corruption, poverty and unemployment, has divided the moral judgment between the government and the protesters. Solutions to the problem were rarely given and when given, abolishing emergency law was the one recommended. State owned newspaper, Al-Ahram framed the protesters with members of the Muslim Brotherhood group and with riots. Example to that, is a story on January 27, page 5 “the banned has spread its agents in the protests to reach its goals.” Except for the info found only in international news and civil society news stories, Al-Ahram focused on attributing protesters with riots incidents that took place all over the country. It stressed on the stories of buildings put on fire and thuggery incidents that took place during that time. In several stories, Al-Ahram has mentioned thugs and protesters in the same sentence, which gives the reader the feeling that they are one. Stories in Al-Ahram didn’t mention anything

about police killing protesters in the streets and has framed them as keeping social order in 61% of stories. State owned paper, Al-Ahram has rarely given a ground to the protesters' voice, it has rarely interviewed them, and accordingly its stories lacked any analysis of their side. This piece of information could only be read in the stories covering both the rights movements' and the international figures' commentaries on the issue. Al-Ahram gave protesters point of view in 11 percent of stories and quoted them in 14 percent of stories. Meanwhile it quoted the public opinion taking the side of the regime in 82 % of stories.

Al-Masry Al-Youm took the side of the revolutionaries more than Al-Ahram during its coverage of the 18 days of uprising yet it did not do that all the way. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the problem from the beginning as "protests" in 90% of stories. It separated clearly between the riots and protests by covering each in a different story in contrast to Al-Ahram. Accordingly, it took the side of protesters as a starting point. It has also framed protesters as "the people" in 33% of stories and as "workers" in 12% of stories and the police as "violent" in 35% of stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm has put the moral responsibility on the government. Al-Masry Al-Youm gave protesters point of view in 63% percent of stories and quoted them in 44% percent of stories. Meanwhile it quoted the public opinion taking the side of the regime in 6.3% of stories. That explains how Al-Masry Al-Youm on the contrary to Al-Ahram took side of the revolutionaries during that phase. Al-Masry Al-Youm coverage of the revolution might have also helped, to bring more people to the streets, especially during the early days January 27: Al-Mary Al-Youm published a story on page 3 saying that Al-Azhar scholars say that protesting is not against religious teachings. However, on the same day and on the same page, they have published

another article discussing how January 25 protests led to a lot of losses in the stock exchange. Al-Masry Al-Youm reported on violence that took place by police against protesters during phase one, police was framed as violent in 35.4% of stories and as keeping social order in only 12.5% of stories.

Phase two: January 29 to February 2

The second phase studied which is the period between January 29 and February 2. This was the time when almost everyone was aware that something really serious was happening in Egypt, the regime was losing its power, most businesses were closed, security vacuum was filling the streets and people were in despair. During that period, Al-Ahram has continued supporting the regime by framing the events as riots in 43.8% of its stories and it framed the events as protests in 44.9% of stories, which didn't happen in the first phase. Al-Ahram continued framing the protesters as violent in 21.5% of stories and as Muslim Brotherhood members in 6.5% of stories. It continued attributing protesters with looting incidents. Moreover, Al-Ahram has framed the changes that the ousted President Hosni Mubarak made during the 18 days to end protests as a sufficient reaction to the people's demands. This was clear in one of its stories when Mubarak appointed Ahmed Shafiq as a prime minister and Omar Soluiman as his vice president.

Moreover, Al-Ahram framed the revolution as a threat which we need to be protected from, "the army should have protected us from those protests," said one story on January 30, page 7. Al-Ahram supported the regime by publishing stories that emphasize events rather than conflicts in 91% of stories. Writing stories in the form of events is reporting on event without giving context or reasons for people to do what they are doing. Example to that publishing stories that says protesters are in the

streets conducting a sit in without saying the reason behind protesting and things are in the country that led to that. Al-Ahram continued to mention the point of view of the protesters on rare occasions, 9% of stories and it only quoted any of them in 3.4% of stories, in contrast to that Al-Ahram gave the officials point of view in 64% of stories. That assures it being the state owned newspaper supporting the regime. Basic rules of journalism are to give a balanced story, give the opinions of different side of the conflict.

Al-Masry Al-Youm during covering phase two continued defining the problem as protests, framing protesters as a mix of miscellaneous actors and workers, and framing the police as violent. Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the problem as protests in 90.5% of stories as a mix of different types of Egyptians in 54.1% of stories and as violent in only 6.8% of stories. Al-Masry Al-Youm took the side of the revolutionaries in phase two also, as it played a major role in revealing the security/police relation with the protesters. On January 29; one day after the major violent events in Egypt, the newspaper published a story documenting that the protesters kept on saying “peaceful, peaceful,” this contradicted with how Al-Ahram framed protesters at that time. A reader who hadn’t been part of the protests and his only relation with the events is the newspapers would really get confused reading those two paper, one pro regime and the other one pro revolution.

Al-Masry Al-Youm played a significant role revealing what the police did to oppress protests during the revolution. Example to that is: it made a reference to the unity between thugs and policemen on January 29, page 8. The story that said thugs, along with police in civilian clothes is harassing girls in the streets of Saeida Zienab. Moreover, Al-Masry Al-Youm created a special file “the day of anger” giving details

on what happened all around Egypt. It even offered an info graphic with red spots where protests took place.

Al-Masry Al-Youm continued giving space for protesters, it gave explanation to their point of view in 56.8% of stories and quoted them in 33.8% of stories during phase two. One reason to do that was publishing features on the revolutionaries and their lives in the square starting January 30, something that Al-Ahram has only started doing only on February 11, the last day of the revolution.

Al-Masry Al-Youm's framing of the revolution was not all the time pro revolution and pro revolutionaries, it fluctuated during each phase as well. Example to that is February 1, one day before Mubarak's speech asking people to give him a second chance, after the army has taken the streets of Egypt, both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm have intensively taken the regime's side, but it was more clear for Al-Masry Al-Youm who was more revolutionary at the beginning. Example for that, the interview with Mohamed Hussenin Heikal in the front page, first story "the army could not open fire to Egyptians' chests" he continued, that the army is part of the people and not the regime. Heikal also asserted that the regime had fallen already.

Also on February 1, Al-Masry Al-Youm published a "letter to the protesters and the army .. peaceful .. peaceful," on the first page. In the letter, they elaborated that their "sources" told them that intruders would get into the square and attack the army officers "who stay to protect the protesters and the Egyptians." Accordingly they asked the people to be on alert. In doing so they framed the army as the protector of the nation and the protesters. They also gave an indication to the reader that there are intruders between protesters, accordingly the reader would emphasize less with the protesters cause he would start doubting who he is emphasizing with, the protesters or the intruders. Moreover, on February 1, was the first stories that depicted

the return of the police to the streets. The paper portrayed them as “changed” and quoted them promising to do their job with a different attitude.

On a different note, February 2 marked the first time the word “revolution” appeared in the independent newspaper, on page 6, as they covered a feature on the one million protest on Friday. “Parts from departure Friday: patriotic songs, revolutionary chants and men try to stop the sound system.” The story mentioned a banner held by one of the protesters, saying, “the revolution continues.”

Phase three: February 3 to February 11

During phase three both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm changed their frames and their stands from the revolution. Al-Ahram was more pro revolution and pro revolutionaries. However, Al-Masry Al-Youm made a division between its coverage of the protests and the workers protesters, something that gives the reader a frame that workers’ protests are not part of the revolution and has attributed the revolutionaries to negative connotations more than it did in previous phases. Al-Ahram framed the problem as protests in 52% of stories and as riots in only 16 %. It framed protesters as youth in 40% and violent in only 0.7%. Al-Masry Al-Youm continued framing the problem as protests. Framed protesters as workers in 35% and mix of different groups in 37% of stories, this was the first phase where Al-Masry Al-Youm highlighted workers protests and separated them from the revolution.

Till the beginning of phase three, Al-Ahram continued supporting the status quo and didn’t give a fair reporting. February 3, 2011, the day after the battle of the camel, when figures of the old regime sent thugs riding camels and horses to attack

protesters in Tahrir Square, was significant day to show the difference between the framing of the two newspapers. Attacks on protesters on that day left 11 dead and 2000 injured. The case is still in Egypt court during the publishing of this study (Ahram Online, 2012). On that day Al-Ahram's front page highlighted the pro Mubarak protests, which were so small in numbers in comparison to anti Mubarak ones. The head of Al-Ahram front page was: "millions went to the street to support Mubarak." On the battle of the camel, the headline was "clashes between pro and anti Mubarak protesters." Inside stories as well were rich with five pro-Mubarak protests. Meanwhile while Al-Masry Al-Youm has reported on the clashes in the front page, the main headline was: "Tahrir turned into a war field and the NDP asks for things to calm down." On that day the difference in framing the same event was huge. Reading Al-Ahram newspaper gives the impression that there are millions supporting Mubarak and reading Al-Masry Al-Youm will show that the regime sent its thugs to attack protesters in Tahrir Square.

Al-Ahram avoided reporting the demand of the protesters that "Mubarak steps down." This might mean that Al-Ahram refused publishing phrases that were against the status quo, which is here the former President. This could be a result of self-censorship by reporters or might result from the general red lines of the newspaper. The first time it was ever mentioned was on February 3. After violence on protesters during the last days of Mubarak, Al-Ahram started changing its agenda. On February 7, the editorial Osama Sayara, Chief Editor, Al-Ahram Newspaper has praised the "nobility" of the protests against Mubarak and his regime. Meanwhile, on February 8, 2011 the newspaper highlighted the news of different reforms committed on the side of the late President Hosni Mubarak to please protesters. These reforms include arresting of figures of the old regime and the government figures reshuffles. Al-

Ahram published a supplement to the newspaper titled “Tahrir Youth” on February 10, one day before Mubarak has handed over the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. February 11, the front page headline “Revolutionary society: Facebookers, Muslim Brotherhoods, Copts, liberals, leftists, Nasserites and colorless people.” This edition was a “special issue from Tahrir” in a four pages features, the newspaper tried to zoom into the lives of revolutionaries demonstrating in Tahrir Square, the pages are full of photos, with great emphasis on the human interest angle in each story. No negative connotations were attributed to the protesters in this issue. Al-Masry Al-Youm continued reporting on the revolution and on the protesters news. It continued giving them space for protesters opinion in 93.9% of stories, quoted them in 56.1% of stories.

However the significant different result in phase three was that Al-Masry Al-Youm delegitimized protesters in 50% of stories instead of 18.8% in phase one and 27% in phase two. This change aligned with the distinction between protesters and the workers protests are the main changes in Al-Masry Al-Youm coverage during the third phase. This alignment of attributing protesters to negative connotations and the increase of workers protests might be explained by the fact that the private owned businessmen own newspaper serves a capitalist agenda. The capitalist agenda conflicts with workers movements as they serve the socialists’ agenda. Accordingly, it could be that the red line of the newspaper starts when the published stories threatens the interests of its owners. The suggestion on capitalists’ agenda could also be supported as Al-Masry Al-Youm sometimes highlighted the negative consequences of the revolution during several points of its coverage. Example to that is January 31, on the third page, it had headlines: “two dead in bread crews and shortage in gas,” “the banks continue to shut down for other two days.” Naguib Sawiris was quoted saying

that AlJazeera's news channel coverage of the current protests is an attempt of "settling political accounts with Egypt." Also on February 9, Al-Masry Al-Youm published a story saying that those kinds of protests, referring to the workers' protests are different from the ones taking place at Tahrir Square. It framed workers' protests and demands as separate. Moreover, the findings that the coverage of private owned media fluctuated during the revolution was also found in a study a study conducted on state owned newspapers, independent newspapers and social media during the exact same period. The state owned newspapers framed the event as a threat to the country "a conspiracy on the Egyptian state," warning economic consequences and attributing blame and responsibility for the chaos on others. Meanwhile, independent newspapers used a combination of two frames, one using a human interest frame defining protests as "a revolution for freedom and social justice" and the other is showing it as a threat (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

Conclusion

Egypt's January 25 Revolution is a critical phase in the modern history of this country. Reporting on the events as they used to happen was very challenging to reporters working in the field. It was also challenging to the decision makers of media production. For the audience, the media were the main tool through which they were able to make sense of what was happening around them. The days were full of debates, protests, looting, burning, tensions and security vacuums. In this research after conducting a content analysis comparing between two popular newspapers, one state owned and one private owned, it is clear that each had its agenda, each had taken a side and each has fluctuated in its coverage. The news stories as well as the situation left the audience wondering and not very well informed. For better journalism service, not only professional news agencies are required, but also well informed and well-trained reporters. Being exposed to only Al-Ahram newspaper at that time would have left the audience afraid of the revolution and thinking it is a threat to the country. Meanwhile, reading Al-Masry Al-Youm only at that time would have left the audience more aware, yet hesitant, revolutionary at a time and against it during other times. More in depth analysis and investigative reporting are needed in both cases. Media agendas are inevitable, although unprofessional. Accordingly, the reader should be more exposed and should be aware of the "right to know." Media literacy campaigns are a significant tool for creating well-informed readers. It will help them pick frames and different agendas used in the media material they are exposed to. Being able to apply the concept of framing studied and implemented mainly in the U.S. media shows that it is applicable on different types of media and in different cultures. The Egyptian media is rich with frames similar to the American one.

Media ownership plays a significant role in agenda used for framing the events. The results of this study assure that the state owned newspaper was against the revolution until its very last days and the independent newspaper fluctuated between supporting the revolution and delegitimizing it. The fluctuation of the private owned media was mostly found in case of workers' protests. Something that showed that private owned media serves the interests of its owners who are in most cases businessmen supporting the capitalist agenda.

The results of this study are obviously limited to Egypt during a specific time period, and should not be generalized to other media sources in the Arab region or outside it. The purpose was to provide a picture of frames used by Egypt's newspapers and popular social media sites and to project future implications for these local media. However, the results may also contribute to the concept of framing during protests, social movements and revolutions. That is a field that is not rich in literature.

The limitation of the study: this study could not be generalized on other newspapers under the same media type. We could not apply Al-Ahram state owned newspaper results on other state owned newspapers and the same applies on Al-Masry Al-Youm. Meanwhile, these results could be an indication on how state media and private media covered the events. The results could not also be generalized on the coverage of those newspapers in general but only on the coverage of the 18 days of the revolution as this marks a very special phase in Egypt's history.

Recommendations for future research: I recommend a qualitative study on the opinion pieces in each newspaper and see whether the frames used in the op-ed section aligned with the news stories or not. A study on agenda setting and how this type of agenda affected the audience is also recommended.

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Appendix

Coding Book

To determine the theme of the story, coding categories were established. The categories included conflict, social disorder, event focus or context focus, and selection of leaders highlighted.

To further address the research questions about the use of the *protest paradigm*, additional coding categories were established. The categories included reliance on official sources or movement sources, cues to public opinion through public opinion polls, overt characterizations, invocation of social norms, violations of laws, symbolic use of bystanders, and framing protestors as delegitimized, marginalized, or demonized. Through this methodology, the framing of the news stories was analyzed and the research questions were addressed.

For answering RQ1: how did Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm frame the Egyptian January 25 revolution? Entman's (1991) frames were used. According to Entman, the media frames define the problem, diagnose causes, give a moral judgment and suggest remedies to the problem. The same frames were used by Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) in studying newspapers and social media framing of Egypt's January 25 Revolution.

1-Definition of the problem frame:

How did the newspaper refer to the revolution? (The definition of the problem):

1. Riots

2. Uprising
3. Protests
4. Peaceful revolution
5. Unrest
6. Facebook revolution
7. Youth revolution
8. Other
9. N/A

The framing of main actors in the revolution

Protesters

1. Muslim Brotherhoods
2. Youth
3. Violent
4. Following foreign agendas
5. Peaceful
6. Seculars
7. Liberals
8. Workers
9. Other (more than one category or others apply)
10. N/A

Hosni Mubarak

1. Father of the nation
2. Patriotic
3. In denial
4. Convenient
5. Failure
6. Other
7. N/A

The Police

1. Victims
2. Keeping social order
3. Violent
4. Neutral
5. Other
6. N/A

The Army

1. Victims
2. Keeping social order
3. Violent
4. Defending the revolutionaries/revolution
5. Neutral
6. Other
7. N/A

The diagnoses of the problem (causality framing):

1. Corruption
2. Poverty
3. Unemployment
4. Foreign agendas
5. Dictatorship
6. Emergency law
7. Police brutality
8. Media irresponsibility
9. Gamal Mubarak gaining power
10. Employment issues
11. Other (more than one category or others apply)
12. N/A

The Moral Judgments (Who's Responsibility the problem stated in the story?)

1. The government responsibility
2. The activist's responsibility
3. NDP responsibility
4. Media responsibility
5. President Mubarak
6. Figures of Mubarak's regime
7. Other
8. N/A

The Suggested Remedies in the story for the situation

1. President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak steps down.
2. Abolition of emergency law
3. Abolition of the State Security Investigation
4. The Declaration of Omar Suleiman commitment not to run for the presidency in the upcoming presidential election.
5. Dissolving both the People's Assembly and Shura council
6. The release of all detained since Jan. 25
7. End the curfew for the return of normal life in all parts of the country
8. Cancellation of the university security guards
9. Investigations with those responsible for the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since 25 January.
10. Dismiss Anas el-fiki and stop the surge and the threat of treason in the media
11. Protesters leave Tahrir Square for life to go back to normal.
12. Issuing the law that gives the right to form political parties.
13. Issuing the law that gives the right to establish trade unions and associations.
14. Achieve true independence of the national newspapers, radio and television nationalists
15. Stop control security in communications and the Internet
16. Other
17. N/A

RQ2: Is the protest Paradigm used in constructing the stories in Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm newspapers?

Please answer the following question by Yes (01) or No (02)

1-Narrative structure and theme:

____ Does the story emphasize a battle or conflict?

(In structuring the narrative of the stories using a battle theme, the majority of stories emphasized events rather than issues by detailing the happenings on the street and not the reasons for these events.)

____ Does the story emphasize the events or the issue?

(Does the story offer background or explanation to the conflict or just covering the event including police and protesters?)

____ Is there a use of warfare metaphors?

(Does the story include words that describe the incident as a war such as battle, charge attack, retreat, outflanked and skirmish line?)

____ Does the story include any of the following phrases?

-tear gas attack

-police and Facebook youth battle

-bloody battleground

-national guard men's mission

-battle gear

-induced minority

____Are protesters described as:

- kicking the police
- throwing rocks
- putting cars on fire
- breaking windows
- provoking the police
- taunting the police

2-Social order theme:

(In this theme, attacking police, breaking windows and throwing stones are used to portray protesters as a threat to the social order. Meanwhile police is framed as maintaining the social order and protecting and doing their job)

____Does the story refer to the protesters as antagonists?

(Does the story indicate any of the following meanings: protesters refuse to leave tahrir square after police warned them, protesters verbally assaulted the police, protesters physically assaulted the police, protesters burning cars or protesters are looting any of the shops or buildings in the streets?)

____Is there any mention of media blockage?

(Does the story include any of the following: security smash into media offices (Al-Jazeera, Al-Sherouk), arrest of journalists, labeling media sources)

3- Public Opinion theme:

____Does the story show the public's support of the current regime and/or the police?

(Does the story show bystanders as injured by the demonstration or scared by the demonstration or supporting the police/regime?)

4-Reliance on official sources:

(In this frame the majority of news stories are told by the official sources' perspective rather than the protesters' one)

_____ Does the story give explanation to the demonstrators' point of view?

_____ Are the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story?

_____ Does the story give explanation to an official point of view?

Emphasis on internal dissent and disparagement of the movement's future effectiveness are framing methods that can result in the delegitimizing of the movement.

5- Delegitimizing:

Several characteristics of the protest paradigm can delegitimize, marginalize, and demonize protesters.

_____ Does the story mention any:

-Trivialization of the protesters (trivialization of the movement can include making

light of movement language, dress, age, style, and goals.)

-polarization

-emphasis on internal dissension;

-marginalization (By showing protestors to be deviant or unrepresentative)

-disparagement by numbers

-disparagement of the movement's effectiveness

-reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities,

- emphasis on the presence of Communists,
- delegitimizing the use of quotation marks
- considerable attention to right-wing oppositions to the protesters (the Muslim Brotherhoods)

Coding Sheet

ID#: _____

Source: _____ 1)Al-Ahram 2)Al-Masry Al-Youm

Date: _____ (4 digit code: January 25 is 0125)

Section _____ 1) Front Page 2) News Pages 3) Feature 4) Economy

Story Format _____ 1) News 2) Feature 3) News Feature

Definition of the problem

How did the newspaper refer to the revolution?

1. Riots
2. Uprising
3. Protests
4. Peaceful revolution
5. Unrest
6. Facebook revolution
7. Youth revolution
8. Other
9. N/A

The framing of main actors in the revolution

Protesters

1. Muslim Brotherhoods

2. Youth
3. Violent
4. Following foreign agendas
5. Peaceful
6. Seculars
7. Liberals
8. Workers
9. Other (more than one category or others apply)
10. N/A

Hosni Mubarak

1. Father of the nation
2. Patriotic
3. In denial
4. Convenient
5. Failure
6. Other
7. N/A

The Police

1. Victims
2. Keeping social order
3. Violent
4. Neutral
5. Other

6. N/A

The Army

1. Victims
2. Keeping social order
3. Violent
4. Defending the revolutionaries/revolution
5. Neutral
6. Other
7. N/A

The diagnoses of the problem

1. Corruption
2. Poverty
3. Unemployment
4. Foreign agendas
5. Dictatorship
6. Emergency law
7. Police brutality
8. Media irresponsibility
9. Gamal Mubarak gaining power
10. Employment issues
11. Other (more than one category or others apply)
12. N/A

The Moral Judgments (Who's Responsibility the problem stated in the story?)

1. The government responsibility
2. The activist's responsibility
3. NDP responsibility
4. Media responsibility
5. President Mubarak
6. Figures of Mubarak's regime
7. Other
8. N/A

The Suggested Remedies in the story for the situation

1. President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak steps down.
2. Abolition of emergency law
3. Abolition of the State Security Investigation
4. The Declaration of Omar Suleiman commitment not to run for the presidency in the upcoming presidential election.
5. Dissolving both the People's Assembly and Shura council
6. The release of all detained since Jan. 25
7. End the curfew for the return of normal life in all parts of the country
8. Cancellation of the university security guards
9. Investigations with those responsible for the use of violence against peaceful demonstrators since 25 January.
10. Dismiss Anas el-fiki and stop the surge and the threat of treason in the media
11. Protesters leave Tahrir Square for life to go back to normal.
12. Issuing the law that gives the right to form political parties.

13. Issuing the law that gives the right to establish trade unions and associations.
14. Achieve true independence of the national newspapers, radio and television nationalists
15. Stop control security in communications and the Internet
16. Other
17. N/A

The Protest Paradigm

Answer the following questions by yes (1) or No (2)

1-Narrative structure and theme:

_____ Does the story emphasize battle?

_____ Does the story emphasize conflict?

_____ Does the story emphasize events?

_____ Does the story emphasize issue?

_____ Does the story use of warfare metaphors?

(Does the story include words that describe the incident as a war such as battle, charge attack, retreat, outflanked and skirmish line?)

_____ Does the story include any of the following phrases?

-tear gas attack

-police and Facebook youth battle

-bloody battleground

-national guard men's mission

-battle gear

-induced minority

_____ Are protesters described as any of the following phrases:

- kicking the police
- throwing rocks
- putting cars on fire
- breaking windows
- provoking the police
- taunting the police

2-Social order theme:

_____ Does the story refer to the protesters as antagonists? (Does the story indicate any of the following meanings?)

_____ Is there any mention of media blockage? (Does the story include any of the following?)

3- Public Opinion theme:

_____ Does the story show the public's support of the current regime and/or the police? (Does the story include any of the following?)

4-Reliance on official sources

_____ Does the story give explanation to the demonstrators' point of view?

_____ Are the heads of demonstrators or individual ones quoted in the story?

_____ Does the story give explanation to an official point of view?

5- Delegitimizing protesters

_____ Does the story mention any:

- Trivialization of the protesters (trivialization of the movement can include

making

light of movement language, dress, age, style, and goals.)

-polarization

-emphasis on internal dissension;

-marginalization (By showing protestors to be deviant or unrepresentative)

-disparagement by numbers

-disparagement of the movement's effectiveness

-reliance on statements by government officials and other authorities,

-emphasis on the presence of Communists,

-delegitimizing the use of quotation marks

-considerable attention to right-wing oppositions to the protestors (the Muslim Brotherhoods)

Pictures:

Answer the following questions: 1) yes 2) No 3) N/A

_____ Does the story contains pictures?

_____ If yes, is the picture bigger than one column?

_____ Is the picture objective?